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The Ku Klux Klan was a major force in American political and social life
throughout the better part of the nineteen-twenties. This study examines the Klan, its
growth, role, and demise with respect to the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It is largely the
story of the Klan’s failure to develop successfully as it was inhibited by local political
factors throughout the Commonwealth.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Historiography
There is perhaps no name in American history that triggers
such strong reactions as that of the Ku Klux Klan. There have been
other similar movements; however, none have been so long lived, or
displayed such a phoenixlike ability to rise from their ashes as the
Invisible Empire. Other groups, from the Known-Nothings of the mid-
nineteenth century to the much later White Citizens Councils a
century later have, in spite of their initial popularity been short lived
affairs. Other reactionary groups, such as the American Legion, which
began as a semi-fascist veteran’s organization, have ultimately
moderated themselves, their methods, and their rhetoric. Fading from
the limelight of publicity that such early extremism brought, these
groups have grown into unassuming, community service
organizations, and in the process faded into near obscurity. While
other groups have developed, exploited, and expressed the same
resurgent themes in their ideology, each new era has seen the
flowering of new and different reactionary-populist groups. The Klan,
uniquely, remains aloof from such changes. The Invisible Empire has
been able to evoke a fear and dread, or alternatively pride and
admiration, in successive generations that is lacking in other
reactionary groups. The idea of the American Legion as a viable Neo-
Fascist organization is laughable today, in sharp and clear contrast to
the notion of a resurgent Klan which remains all too palpable. The
1
White Citizen’s councils will never rise again and flourish as they once
did, but the specter of hooded Klansmen remains a powerful force
within the American psyche. 
 The first and third Klans were founded to overcome Federal
intervention in the South.1 These Klan engaged in many and varied
acts of terror but embraced a decentralized structure which made any
central planning impossible. Rather they reflected an intensely local
structure that drew upon the massive frustration among Southerners
against Federal efforts to promote equality.  Relying upon whippings,
beatings, lynching, and other forms of violence these Klans attacked
whites sympathetic to Reconstruction policies and above all else
Blacks. 
Yet while the first and third Klans were spontaneous outbursts
of these White Protestant Nationalist sentiments the second version of
the Klan, lasting from approximately 1915 to 1930, was a far different
creature. Deliberate design was at work in the second incarnation of
the Invisible Empire. While the first and final Klans had been
outbursts of a nationalism every bit as Southern and regional as it
was White and Protestant, the second Klan bore a distinctively
American variety of nationalism. This Klan's foes were far more vague
social trends and tendencies. While earlier and later Klans fought
against unpopular legislative programs the second Klan targeted not
the government, but the groups in the nation who displayed values
and qualities different from what Klansmen saw as '100% American.'
1 David Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: the history of the Ku Klux Klan 3rd ed. (New York:
Quadrangle Books, 1981),  8-21.
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Catholics, Jews, Blacks, and immigrants were favorite targets of the
Klan, but others, such as whites who failed to live within the
boundaries of conservative morality were often victims as well. In
short this Klan's targets were unique yet, at like other Klans, this
organization remained nationalist, white, protestant, and militant.
The second Klan was the creation of Joseph Simmons, a former
Methodist minister, veteran of the Spanish-American War and
fraternal organizer. Simmons’s life up until the founding of the Klan
had not been particularity successful; His unit in the war with Spain
was never sent overseas, and he had never held a permanent place
with the Methodist church, remaining instead an itinerant preacher.
Finally Simmons found his greatest success as a fraternal organizer
recruiting men into various organizations, such as the Free Masons
and Oddfellows. In 1915 he saw the potential in the imagery of the
Klan, and furthermore he knew first-hand the potential of the vigilante
justice the Klan stood for. 2
Simmons had lived in Atlanta during one of its stormiest periods
and had been witness to the outrage over the death of Mary Phagan, a
13-year-old girl working in a pencil factory in the city. Her murder in
1913, and the subsequent trial of her Jewish employer, Leo Frank,
attracted nationwide publicity. In the wake of these events a group
including Simmons, formed the so called “Knights of Mary Phagan.”
Following the commutation of Frank's sentence by the governor, some
of the 'knights' broke into Frank's jail cell and lynched him.3 Seeing
2 Chalmers, 21-28.
3 Robert and Nancy Frey,  The Silent and the Damned: The Murder of Mary Phagan and the Lynching
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the potential in this body and, perhaps reading in Tom Watson's
Jeffersonian magazine “another Ku Klux Klan.... [ought] to be
organized to restore home rule.”4 Simmons acted to organize a body
that would reflect both the imagery and many of the ideas of the first
Klan. 
Other influences impacted the growth of the Klan. First among
these was the massive popularity of D.W. Griffith's Birth of a Nation,
and the novel on which it was based, The Clansman, which served to
spread the myth of the Klan as defender of law, order, and whiteness
in the aftermath of the Civil War far beyond the South. The Klan was
presented not as the enemy of equality but as the ally of justice and
law.  Adding to this popularity was the Klan’s embrace of nationalism
during the period of hyper-patriotism stimulated by US entry into the
First World War. A phenomenon which was intensely intertwined with
the Espionage Act, the Red Scare, and other events of the late
nineteen-teens, an association noted by historian David Chalmers
among others.5
Clearly, even though it was an expression of the same
phenomenon that both preceded and followed it, the Klan of the 1920s
retains a unique place within US history. This Klan displayed a
hierarchical, organized structure, and one that allowed for a
nationwide organization and a centrally generated ideology. Beginning
of Leo Frank (Lanham: Madison Books, 1988), 84.
4. “Thomas Watson's Jeffersonian”  Sept. 2, 1915 quoted in C. VannWoodward, Tom Watson, Agrarian
Rebel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 446. 
5 Chalmers, 28-38.
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with John Moffatt Mecklin's work in 1925 numerous historians,
sociologists, political theorists, and others have made the Klan the
focus of intense study.6 
Historians of the Klan can largely be divided into two schools of
thought. The traditionalist view came first and was heavily influenced
by Mecklin's view of the Klan, which was itself developed from
contemporary images. The early understanding viewed the Klan as
primarily a violent and rural phenomenon. Later came a more
moderate revisionary view, grew in response to shortcomings within
the traditional understanding.
Early scholarship tended to view not only the Klan, but also the
Klansmen themselves in disparaging terms embracing adjectives for
the Klansmen such as “rustic,” “narrow minded” and “gullible.”7 While
necessarily condemning the Klan, and understandably so, this view
was unfortunate in that it needlessly and unnecessarily stereotyped
the members of an organization that was very much within the
ideological mainstream of its day. Integral to the early view of
traditionalists was a supposed divide between urbanites and residents
of small towns. Advocates of the early view held that the Klan
represented a broader movement that embraced the last remnants of
19th century morality and culture, and in the process brought
excitement to an otherwise mundane provincial existence. 
6 John Moffatt Mecklin, The Ku Klux Klan: A Study of the American Mind (New York: Russell and
Russell, 1924), 95-125.
7 Wyn Craig Wade,  The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America  (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1987), 219-221.
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The first scholars to examine the Klan, such as Mecklin, and
Frank Tannenbaum emphasized its being centered on small town life,
with a regional focus that lay heavily in the Southern states of the old
Confederacy. Writing in the 1920s they acknowledged the Klan as
having some nationwide following, yet this earliest of Klan scholarship
still retained an incorrect assumption that the Klan was primarily a
peculiar aspect of Southern regionalism.8 
Shortly thereafter, Robert and Helen Lynds’ work would explore
the role of the Klan in the Midwest. The Lynds’ work added several
new facets to the debate, acknowledging for the first time the Klan's
extreme popularity in the Midwest and West, as well introducing the
idea of 'status anxiety' as a cause for the popularity of the Klan.9
Through the 1950s and early 60s historians of the Klan
continued to develop these same themes. Prominent historians such
as John Higham argued that the Klan was a “litmus test” of the
previous century’s Anglo-Saxon values. Higham saw the Klan as part
of a wider trend in American history of conflict between rural-nativist
townsmen, and cosmopolitan urban-immigrant groups.10 
Later, historian Richard Hofstadter suggested that the culture
clash which the Klan represented was exacerbated by the relative
prosperity of the 1920s. His book The Age of Reform: From Bryan to
FDR argued that the Klan reflected a final effort of some Anglo-Saxons
8 John Moffatt Mecklin, 95-125 . Frank Tannenbaum, The Darker Phases of the  South (New York:
Negro University Press, 1924), 3-38. 
9 Helen and Robert Lynd, Middletown: A Study in Modern American Culture (New York: Harcourt
Brace and Company, 1929), 481-484.
10 John Higham, Strangers in the Land Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925  2nd ed (New York:
Rutgers University Press, 1955), 285-299.
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to preserve their culture in the face of increased modernity. Hofstadter
held that the increasing affluence of the Jazz Age had made possible
the expression of pluralistic elements that had previously been mere
subtle undercurrents in American society. He argued that the Klan
arose out of white nativist disgust with this sudden manifestation of
permissive plurality. These same themes were later borrowed by other
authors in their analysis of the Klan’s role within the era.11
In all of these earliest histories of the Klan the organization was,
while necessarily condemned as divisive, also regarded in inferior
terms. The prevailing attitude was that Klansmen were somehow less
rational and sane than other Americans. Such views were overly
simplistic toward the Klan and its members and failed to reflect any
hope of rationality on the part of Klansmen.
For the next several years, the original view, as set forth by
Mecklin and accepted by the majority of historians after him, went
through a small but significant change. In The Ku Klux Klan in
American Politics Arnold Rice suggested that the Klan went beyond
simply mobilizing native white Protestant militancy. He argued that
the Klan was in some cases a decisive force in local and national
politics. Thus for the first time historians presented a group that
might be more than a mere fraternal order predisposed toward
vigilante justice and nativism. Rice did not seek to overthrow the then
predominant view of the Klan as an organized vigilante militia made
11 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR (Knopf: New York, 1955), 288-301.
William E. Leucthenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-32 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1958), 209. John Hicks, Republican Ascendancy: 1921-1933 (New York: Harper Collins, 1960), 95.
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up of marginal whites. Instead he argued that Klansmen might base
their voting patterns on their conservative inclinations and realized
that block voting might trigger an upset in the political balance of
power. He noted that some politicians actively pandered to the Klan's
agenda. While such an assertion might seem obvious today it was, at
the time, a considerable breakthrough. However Rice’s work continued
to dehumanize the Klansmen themselves, and view them as deviant at
best.12
David Chalmers, among the most influential historians of his
era, examined the Klan in his work Hooded Americanism. Chalmers
not only dealt with the Klan in the 1920s, but in the 1860-70s and
1950s as well, treating it as a consistent national phenomenon
developing and growing over time. Chalmers argued that the Klan had
not only been consistent between its 1920s organization and its
development in the Reconstruction era, but also was pursuing many
of the same policies in the context of the 1950s and 60s as well. His
work was by far the most extensive on the Klan to that point.
Chalmers claimed that at its core the Klan was always concerned with
status anxiety. His work was also noteworthy for several other
reasons, including its well developed examination of the role of the
hyper-nationalism of the Red Scare and post-World War One era in
the development of the Klan.13 
Robert Moats Miller was among the most vehement of
traditionalists, and argued that the Klan was a violent reactionary
12 Arnold Rice, The Ku Klux Klan in American Politics (Washington: Haskell House, 1962), 30-38.
13 Chalmers, 1-21, 343-373.
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fringe. Miller felt that any attempt at revisionist history simply ignored
the information available on the Klan's brutality. In response to early
challenges to the traditional view he believed that the obvious
conclusion was that the Klan had been an organization thriving on
terror and intimidation.14 
While each of these authors made unique contributions to our
understanding of the Klan there were certain fundamental flaws in
their views. While the Klan’s anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, and racist
and nativist sentiments are undoubtedly offensive, the marginalization
of those who espoused such attitudes had been an inaccurate
assessment in most of the original scholarship on the second Klan.
Additionally, the view that the Klan existed primarily as a violent and
vigilante fringe focusing its attacks on minorities and immigrants
ignored the fact that the Klan was strongest in those states where
those groups made up a minute fraction of the population.
Furthermore the early works on the Klan dealt with the organization
and its members as a homogeneous group and failed to acknowledge
the distinctions within the Klan on the basis of location, class, and
social background. Likewise this view largely failed to consider or
analyze the Klan's regional variations. Other difficulties were also
apparent in this scholarship; an obvious question, and one often left
unanswered was; If the Klan was a reactionary fringe movement, why
did a bipartisan Congress move to limit immigration for the first time
during this same era, thereby granting a central demand of the Klan?
14 Robert Moats Miler, “The Ku Klux Klan” in Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America:
The 1920s ed. John Braeman, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968), 215-255.
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Clearly the Klan was not so peripheral to American culture as
traditionalists held.
In the early 1960s new authors began to challenge this view,
recognizing that the Klansmen were largely “average, seemingly
harmless citizens.”15 New historians such as Charles Alexander
argued that the Klan's primary goal was merely the maintenance of a
“moral status quo.” Alexander's examination of the Klan showed that
the Invisible Empire ignored blacks, Jews, and Catholics in the Old
Southwest and instead directed its considerable ire at whites who
stepped outside traditional social norms. Alexander recognized that
'traditional values' as opposed to status anxiety were the primary Klan
motivation.  Thus he wrote that the focus of Klansmen was not the
minorities within their midst, but instead a drive for in-group
uniformity among white Protestants.16  
Next came Kenneth Jackson's the Ku Klux Klan in the City,
which argued that the Klan was at least as strong within the urban
environment as it was in the small towns and villages that the
traditional school had seen as the Klan's only strongholds. Jackson
showed the Klan’s membership was over twenty thousand in several
cities throughout the US. Jackson went on to argue that these urban
Klans were able to dominate the organization within their states.
While Jackson accepted that the Klan's overall membership might be
larger in the countryside than in the major cities, he proposed that,
15 Leonard Moore, “Historical Interpretations of the 1920s Klan” in The Invisible Empire in the West
ed. Shawn Lay, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 25.
16 Charles Alexander,  The Ku Klux Klan in the Southwest (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,
1966), 23.
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since the Klan's organizational headquarters in all states were located
in cities, the city chapters maintained a crucial edge in determining
the policies of the Klan. Jackson also placed the urban Klan within
the context of a changing urban labor market. Jackson argued that
urban Klansmen favored the organization not only out of ideological
sympathy, but also out of purely economic self-interest stemming
from new competition from fear of immigrant laborers and black
laborers arriving as part of the Great Migration. Also critical to his
thesis, and a foreshadowing of later events, was the Klan’s control of
urban neighborhoods.  Thus Jackson seemed to turn the Klan's place
in history on its head, and in this he was typical of the revisionists.
Where earlier scholars had seen the Klan as a purely rural,
ideologically moribund body, and a group on the fringe, Jackson and
the other revisionists showed that the Klansmen could be urban,
motivated by  concrete goals, and above all more mainstream in their
ideology than most early historians had been willing to admit.17
Other authors took the revisionary view further. Kenneth Wald
produced an excellent if dry statistical analysis of the Klan's role in
elections for city and national office in Memphis, Tennessee. Most
importantly for the revisionists, Wald’s work showed that Klan voters
were not significantly different from other voters in Memphis. He also
suggested that the Klan varied “greatly [depending] upon the local
context.”18
17 Kenneth Jackson, The Ku Klux Klan in the City 1915-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press
1967), 235-49.
18 Kenneth Wald, “The Visible Empire: The Ku  Klux Klan as an Electoral Movement” in Journal of
Interdisciplinary History 11 (Autumn 1980), 217-234.
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Yet perhaps most significant for the revisionists was the work of
scholars, such as William Jenkins, whose specific local studies bore
out local variances and patterns of Klan activity. Jenkins
demonstrated that Klansmen in Youngstown, Ohio were primarily
concerned with issues of morality.19 He later expanded this theme into
a full length book, Steel Valley Klan, which went beyond Youngstown
to include information on the entire northeastern Ohio steel producing
region. While holding to most of the arguments of the revisionists,
Jenkins suggested that the Klan might in some instances go beyond
the 'working class conservatism' which Jackson had suggested.20 
 The Klan of Indiana became the focus of several revisionary
works, due both to its massive enrollment and the unique fact that its
membership rolls were relatively well preserved. The first of these was
William Lutholtz's Grand Dragon. Lutholtz, a journalist, wrote what is
primarily a biography of Indiana Klan leader D.C. Stephenson.
However it also contained significant new information on Stevenson’s
trial and conviction for the murder of Madge Oberholtzer, the original
transcripts of which had disappeared from state records.21 
Coinciding with the publication of Lutholtz's work was a far
more scholarly study by Leonard Moore. Moore demonstrated that
between one third and one quarter of eligible Indiana men joined the
Invisible Empire in the early 1920s, showing once again that the Klan
19 William Jenkins, “The Ku Klux  Klan  in Youngstown, Ohio: Moral  Reform In the Twenties” in The
Historian  (1978), vol: 41 issue 1, 76.
20 William Jenkins, Steel Valley Klan: The Ku Klux Klan in Ohio's Mahoning Valley (Kent, Ohio:  Kent
State University  Press, 1990), 79.
21 William Lutholtz, Grand Dragon: DC Stephenson and the Ku Klux Klan in Indiana (West Lafayette,
Indiana: Prude University Press, 1991), 1-24.
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represented popular sentiments. His work developed the theme of
White Protestant Nationalism as a central part of the Klan's appeal.
Moore also revealed the role of the Klan in overturning local and state
political systems and realigning leadership in both parties. Like the
other revisionists Moore showed that the emphasis of the Klan was
not on violence but rather primarily on the issues of morality and
related legislation, social control, and philanthropy. Moore also
emphasized that the values of the Klan were not far removed from
those of most Americans in the era, and showed that the Klan had
popularity that went far beyond rural fundamentalists. Urban
Evangelicals and other Protestants freely participated in the Klan and
supported its efforts to clear communities of liquor, prostitution, and
corruption. The Klan, however, proved incapable of attaining these
goals when it did hold power. As Moore points out, the Klan was
unable to inaugurate real change once it held power. This
ineffectiveness combined with the sensational murder trial of DC
Stephenson in 1925 lead to the elimination of the Klan as viable force
in Indiana, and indeed in the nation as a whole.22
 Shawn Lay's work on El Paso in The Invisible Empire in the West
further developed the revisionist image of the 1920s Klan. Lay argues
that the Klan in El Paso very often ignored Hispanic minorities, who in
the southwest often made up local majorities, and instead focused on
the morality of white elites. Indeed this focus was in spite of ties
22 Leonard Moore, Citizen Klansmen: The Ku Klux Klan in Indiana 1921-1928 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1991), 184-192. Moore's study had appeared as a dissertation 6 years earlier,
but was not published until 1991.
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between the local business elite and lower class Hispanics which
might have lead the Klansmen to set their sights on Hispanics instead
of whites. The Klan demanded that local political leadership enforce
prohibition, reduce graft and corruption, stop illegal smuggling of
alcohol, and cease vote-buying. Lay’s work was methodologically
significant as well in that it did not base a revisionist interpretation on
new sources such as the membership rolls available to Moore and
others. Lay relied almost solely on the newspaper articles and Klan
literature, which had been the mainstay of traditional interpretations
of the Klan.23
Lay also produced an examination of the Klan in upstate New
York that developed similar themes to his earlier work on the Klan in
the West. In Buffalo the Klan fought against the administration of
Catholic mayor Frank Schwab but in the end accomplished very little.
In general the work reiterated the revisionist view of the Klansmen as
rational men, not the mere brutes of traditionalist interpretations.24 
The hallmarks of the revisionists were a view of the Klan that
saw it as more than a fringe group, the recognition of local
circumstances as dictating the Klan's policy and activity, the rejection
of the Klan as solely or even primarily a vigilante group, and
recognition of the Klan as a valid indicator of mainstream attitudes
and outlooks. 
 Yet some works can be difficult to categorize. Indeed one of the
23 Shawn Lay, The Invisible Empire in the West : Toward a  New Historical Appraisal of the Ku Klux
Klan of the 1920s (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 67-92. 
24 Shawn Lay, Hooded Knights on the Niagara,: The Ku Klux Klan in Buffalo, New York (New York:
New York University Press, 1995), 85-115.
14
earliest of the histories of the Klan, The Ku Klux Klan in Pennsylvania:
A Study in Nativism written in 1936, foreshadowed much of the
revisionists’ argument. Emerson Loucks's work relied heavily on the
Klansmen themselves, many of whom consented to be interviewed.
However, Loucks's work painted the Klansmen as more victims than
victimizers, especially noting violence and economic discrimination
against Klansmen at the hands of Catholics. While Loucks's view does
agree with what later revisionists suggested overall, it remained an
anomaly in Klan literature for several decades.25
Historian Ellis Hawley combined elements of the revisionists’
arguments within a largely traditionalist framework. He argued that
the Klan was more akin to the contemporary fascist movements of
Europe than to more familiar American center-right populism. Yet
Hawley agreed that the Klan clearly displayed regional variations, and
accepted that the Klan could be quite different based on local
prejudices and sentiments, essential elements of the revisionist view.26
Finally, in the historiography of the second Klan some works
stand out, not only for their contributions, but also in their
uniqueness. Nancy MacLean's Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The
Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan is one such case. MacLean is the
primary dissenter among modern historians disputing the established
view. She examines the case of the Klan in Athens, Georgia, a small
city built around the University of Georgia. She concludes the Klan
25 Emerson Loucks, The Ku Klux Klan in Pennsylvania: A Study in Nativism (Harrisonburg,
Pennsylvania: Telegraph Press, 1936), 19-47.
26 Ellis Hawley, The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order: A History of the American People
and their institutions.  1917-1933 2nd ed. (New York: Waveland Press 1979), 128-129.
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was largely a middle-class based group in Athens, but also examines
why it was not more strongly opposed in one of the progressive
bastions of the state. MacLean examines the Klan’s development
paying special attention to the issues and interactions of race, class
and most importantly, gender. Her work is the first to apply feminist
techniques to the study of the second Klan. Indeed MacLean is among
the first to suggest that the rising agency of women in the twenties
was a primary issue for the Klansmen. Additionally she sees issues of
class as more important to Klansmen than issues ‘traditional morals.’
In doing so she set herself apart from the revisionists who viewed the
Klan's focus on nativism and religion as more important than class
differences.27
Another work of significance is Kathleen Blee's Women of the
Klan: Racism and Gender of the 1920s. Blee looks at the role of gender
in the Klan, and examines the role of women in the day to day
activities of the Klan, and its feminine auxiliary, the Women of the Ku
Klux Klan. Blee notes that far from being peripheral to the
organization, women were often at the forefront of its activities. Nor
were these women a small clique within the Invisible Empire, for Blee
points out that over 500,000 women joined the Women of the KKK,
and in some places, they numbered as much as a third of the eligible
female population. Perhaps most significant was Blee's evidence of a
great overlap between the Klan membership and membership in other
progressive women's groups. Blee shows that the women of the Klan
27 Nancy MacLean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994), 14.
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often were also members of the Women's Christian Temperance
Union, the League of Women Voters, and other groups which would
not ordinarily be associated with the reactionary attitudes of the
Klan.28
Also significant are those works that have touched upon the
specific context of Kentucky and its Klan. A large part of Kentucky
falls within the region of Appalachia and as such has a story all its
own. Most historians of Appalachia have held to the traditionalist
image of the Klan as a terrorist organization over the revisionist view
that it was a populist movement.
Joseph Trotter's Coal, Class, and Color deals with the Klan
specifically within the context of West Virginia. Trotter notes the
Klan's existence there as a social control measure for white elites,
serving as a means of oppression against blacks. Trotter suggests that
the Klan was active in West Virginia during the period of about 1920-
25, but, although present, was never the massive social phenomenon
that it was in states such as Indiana or Ohio.29
Ronald Lewis's Black Coal Miners in America argues that the
Klan was used to stir racial animosity and thereby indirectly
discourage unionism. Although there was certainly the potential for
the Klan to be used by mine owners and management as a tool for
this purpose Lewis does not suggest this to have been the case.
Rather, where the Klan is mentioned it is dealt with more as an
28 Kathleen Blee, Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s (Oxford: University of
California Press, 1991), 2, 29, 40, 101-122.
29 Joseph Trotter, Coal, Class, and Color : Blacks in Southern West Virginia, 1915-32 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1990), 48, 71-73 212, 214.
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opportunistic organization that played upon the racial views of miners
to create new members within the Invisible Empire. Given the United
Mine Workers of America’s policy of excluding Klansmen from
membership any Klan successes in mining regions became defeats for
unionists. The Klan, however, remains tangential to Lewis's overall
work. Thus while it is described within the context of Ohio's mining
regions, where the Klan was a major force, Lewis never examines the
Invisible Empire's activities in other Appalachian regions such as
eastern Kentucky and Tennessee.30
Other works deal with Kentucky as a whole. James Bolin's
Bossism and Reform in a Southern City: Lexington, Kentucky, 1880-
1940 and Pem Davidson Buck’s Worked to the Bone examine life
within urban and rural Kentucky respectively. Both Buck and Bolin
showed how, by judicious use of jobs, money, personal interaction,
and outright fraud, local bosses could maintain their electoral
majorities and political power. Yet nowhere does Bolin mention the
Klan as a force in urban politics throughout the era.31 Buck does deal
with the Klan but her analysis is largely a rehash of existing literature.
Rather her interest, as a sociologist, is in applying the traditionalist
view of the Klan to the organization in Kentucky. She views the Klan
as part of a wider effort to defuse class solidarity among the poor of
Kentucky.32 
30 Ronald Lewis, Black Coal Miners in America : Race, Class, and Community Conflict, 1780-1980
(Lexington : University Press of Kentucky, 1987), 243-273.
31 James Duane Bolin, Bossism and Reform in A Southern City (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 2000),75-95.
32 Pem Buck Davidson, Worked to the Bone: Race, Class, Power and Privilege in Kentucky (New
York: Monthly Review Press,2002),142-153.
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Joseph Klotter's Portrait of Paradox: Kentucky 1900-1950, is
primarily a political history of the Commonwealth, but also includes
some attention to social and economic developments. Like Davidson
Klotter argues politics within the Commonwealth were extremely
oligarchic and machine driven, at both the state and local levels.
Additional overlap between Buck and Klotter lies in their shared belief
that Kentucky's elites often took a leading role in extralegal and quasi-
legal violence, in an effort to maintain status, prestige and their
leadership role.33 Indeed this sort of violent elite role played an
important part in the Klan's development in Kentucky.
Perhaps the best use of the traditionalist view is to understand
how the Klan’s contemporaries viewed the organization. With clear
roots in the scholarship of the 1920s the traditionalist view of the
extremist, violent Klan, is best suited to understanding what many of
those who interacted with the Klan expected of the Invisible Empire.
While Klansmen may have viewed themselves as expressing moderate
views of how society ought to function, those outside the organization
seem to have thought them quite violent. 
While the revisionists are most likely correct in their assumption
that the Klan was not always so violent or outside the mainstream as
first believed, this does not disprove the notion of a contemporary view
of the violent Klan. Rather the revision reflected that the Klan was
popular and intensely local, one thing in California and another in
Maryland. Still, in an era when mere union organizers were seen by
33 James Klotter, Kentucky: Portrait in Paradox: 1900-1950 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,
1996), 1-73.
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many as closet communists, and when  many took seriously warnings
that the Knights of Columbus were plotting a violent  overthrow of
government,  expecting violence from the Klan does not seem so
unreasonable. Fears of massive violence outside the established socio-
political system were commonplace and were easily leveled in an era
when even the most seemingly outrageous charges were believed by
millions. Clearly the Klan, which so emphasized its links to the
original Klan of Reconstruction, could be viewed by both friends and
enemies as a primarily violent vigilante organization.
 Rather in spite of how the Klansmen saw themselves, those
outside the Klan believed it to be a real, violent organizing force. At a
time when rumors of violent groups ready to suddenly seize
government power abounded, the Klan appeared to many as just
another such organization.  Indeed the Klan after the change of
leadership in 1922, when the more political Hiram Evens replaced
Klan founder Simmons as head of the organization, displayed an overt
interest in politics.
The Klan did influence politics, both local and state-wide in
neighboring Indiana and to a lesser extent in Ohio and West Virginia.
With the Klan as a great force in those states, it served as a powerful
warning to established political parties, bosses, and machines in
Kentucky.  The Klan entirely reshaped the structure of political parties
and political life in all of Indiana, and portions of Tennessee, Ohio,
and West Virginia and could potentially do the same elsewhere.
Clearly the Klan represented a clear and present threat to established
20
politics, a fact which politicians in the Commonwealth would have
been well aware.
As will be seen the relatively weak Kentucky Klan was opposed
by officials throughout the state. How and why they were able to
suppress the Klan are important issues. Few states were as successful
in stopping Klan activity as Kentucky, and the methods used here
show much about both the Klan and Kentucky. Furthermore, while
historians since Chalmers have shown the role of the First World War
and Red Scare on promoting the Klan's growth, none have yet
suggested that local variations in the development of these
phenomenon impacted the Klan's growth in a specific place. This also
is an important issue which must be dealt with in order to more fully
understand both the Klan and the Commonwealth.
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Chapter 2: Vigilantes and Politicians
In order to fully understand the factors impacting the growth of the
Commonwealth’s Klan it is necessary to understand the overall status of
Kentucky at this time. Clearly factors unique to Kentucky played a role
in the development of the Klan as a body there.
Kentucky is a relatively rural state and had only three major urban
areas. Louisville was by far the largest city in the Commonwealth and
contained 286,369 of the states 2,416,630 residents. Lexington is a far
smaller city and in 1920 its population was a relatively minor 54,664.
Cincinnati’s influence on the society of north-central Kentucky was
significant but cannot be measured precisely as the census of 1920 did
not make efforts to define or analyze the metro area as more recent
censuses have done. Beyond these urban islands Kentucky is dominated
by farmland. The land is divided into small counties and contains
innumerable small towns, often the county seats of their respective
counties.1 
Kentucky, like the whole of the United States, was undergoing a
rapid transformation during the first decades of the twentieth century.
Following America’s entry into World War I these urges came to be
directed not only against the German enemy in Europe but also against
more local forces that were seen as unAmerican in the eyes of many.
Precisely who and what was deemed unAmerican could vary considerably
1 Richard Forstall, Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990
(Washington: Population Division US Bureau of the Census, 1997), 1.
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depending on whose hands the decision was in, but pacifists, socialists,
opponents of the war, and German-Americans (both naturalized citizens
and resident aliens), were generally targeted. In addition, various groups
could be added and, while the American Legion and the Ku Klux Klan
might disagree over exactly how ‘unAmerican’ Catholics and bootleggers
were, they certainly both saw fit to expand the list of wartime enemies to
include the newly formed American Communist Party and other groups
deemed antithetical to the ‘American way of life.’2
Instrumental to an understanding of the development of the Klan
during this era is a basic understanding of the nature of Kentucky's
politics. With over 120 counties, Kentucky at this time was second
overall in the nation in terms of counties per square mile and third in
total number of counties. Furthermore, Kentucky's counties dominated
the government of the state in the twentieth century, with most political
power being intensely local in character and exerted by means of political
machines.3
Following American entry into the First World War, the United
States government passed the Espionage Act, which greatly limited civil
liberties and produced a political climate where a wide range of activities
were deemed 'unAmerican.' The narrow definition of 'American' that the
Espionage Act produced is critical to understanding the philosophic
2 William Pencak, For God and Country: The American Legion 1919-1941 (Boston: New England
University Press, 1989), 1-28. Chalmers, 2, 49, 109–11.
3 Robert Ireland, Little Kingdoms: The Counties of Kentucky (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1977) vii 143 145-146, 148-150. Jackson, The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 10–11. 
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ground in which the revived Ku Klux Klan would flourish. This
ideological climate played a critical role in the Klan’s growth.
Furthermore the act, along with the ensuing Sedition Act, left a clear trail
of records and court cases 4 
Beyond mere acceptance of suspension of civil liberties by civic
authorities in the name of the 'war effort' and 'national security,' many in
Kentucky went a step further to enact vigilante justice in the name of
patriotism. These activities went beyond simple violence against German-
Americans, vigilante actions often took the form of attacks on pacifists
and others who bore left of center views which were too extreme for local
sensibilities. Yet particularly significant, and particularly unique to
Kentucky, these activities included local political officials in a direct
leadership role at the heads of violent mobs undertaking actions against
dissidents.5 
While vigilante violence and official prosecutions both appeared
elsewhere in the era of the Red Scare, they were nowhere tied so closely
together as in Kentucky. Many officials within the Commonwealth of
Kentucky not only embraced vigilante methods but actively sought to
control this activity by taking on a leadership role within vigilante
groups. This unique role is indicative of a broader effort by many of
Kentucky’s elites to control and dominate such extra-legal efforts. Elites
in neighboring states left no evidence of having made such concerted
4 Chalmers,  28-43.
5 John Higham ,194-234. Robert K. Murray, Red Scare: A study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920
(Minneapolis: McGraw-Hill, 1955) 190-91. 
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efforts to dominate the leadership of informal groups during this period.
Rather, in other states elites seem to have worked within the existing
legal system to suppress radicalism, ignoring for the most part the
vigilante activities that reflected populist forms of reactionary politics.
Elites generally ignored the activities of mobs and other groups outside
the law, if their targets could be loosely classified as radicals. This is not
to suggest that either vigilanteism or ‘lawful’ suppression of the left were
not common throughout the US; rather, it is to suggest that elites
elsewhere preferred to work within existing legal structures, and ignored
vigilante efforts at radical suppression. In contrast, Kentucky’s elites
seemed equally and consistently likely to lead both legal proceedings and
the mob as a means of repression.6
 A particularly well documented account of these activities
occurred in the Covington area of Kentucky in the spring and summer of
1918. There, an organization grew and developed which sought out
'enemies of the United States' among the area’s German-Americans,
socialists, IWW members, and Catholics. Other victims included those
6 ACLU archives, reel 4, volumes 32, 36, 38; reel 6 volumes 53-55; reel 7 volume 57; reel 8 volumes 60,
63-68; reel 8, volume 70; reel 9 volume 90; reel 10 volume 91; reel 11 volume 92; reel 19 volumes 136-
140; reel 24 volume 171; reel 25 volumes 178, 179, 182, 183; reel 26 volumes 185, 186 While pursuing the
restoration of Civil Liberties, the early ACLU (also alternatively know as the National Civil Liberties
Bureau (NCLB) before 1920) engaged in a wide variety of cases dealing with the various aspects of civil
liberties dealing with the Red Scare, Espionage Act, Sedition Act, labor unions, and the more informal
measures taken against leftists, and radicals. These cases make up the overwhelming majority of cases
during this era. None of Kentucky’s neighbors displayed a single instance of mob’s lead by appointed
officials, elected officials, and/or men noted for wealth and/or political power.
Pem Davidson Buck, 105. This work examines a variety of issues dealing with class relationships in
Kentucky. Buck notes that elites lead parties of lower-class anti-union ‘night riders’ at least as far back as
1905, which may indicate that the pattern of vigilante groups leading lower class elements against
progressive forces in Kentucky was nothing new.
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who had failed to contribute significantly and visibly to the war effort.
What makes this group, so noteworthy are not its targets but the fact
that it was led by those who, in most other contexts, would have been
content to use police and the courts to achieve such ends. 
This group, the self-styled Citizen’s Patriotic League, was
responsible for many outburst of populist violence. One particular such
attack occurred on the night of March 18, 1918, in the city of Covington,
Kentucky. There a local pacifist, socialist, and church pastor, John
Bigelow, was taken from his home and removed by a mob to a wooded
area outside the city. There he was horsewhipped, beaten, and advised to
leave the city and its environs at once.  Perhaps more importantly,
Bigelow was doused in flammable oil, and this may be an indication that
some members of the group intended to burn him alive, a feature of
many lynchings. Fortunately for Bigelow he was never set alight, and the
use of oil may have been only meant as a further warning. While Bigelow
did not die he was severely injured and bed-ridden for several months.7 
This activity, so similar to the Night Riding of the Klan, was not an
isolated incident. On the night of June 5, 1918, the Citizen's Patriotic
League demanded loyalty oaths from several German-Americans. Over
the course of the night a large band of approximately 200 individuals
carried in over 40 automobiles traveled the length and breadth of Kenton
County, denouncing ‘unAmerican' activity and demanding loyalty oaths
7ACLU archives,  reel 7 volume 60. Cincinnati Enquirer, March 19, 1918 page 8.
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from over a half dozen individuals, including a Roman Catholic priest.
The group also entered two German-American owned taverns and
demanded similar oaths from the proprietors.  In each case the victim
was called out from his home or business by the crowd and made to
state his loyalty to the United States government. Additionally, victims
were required to make a quite sizable contribution of $100 toward the
Red Cross. In the words of Harvey Myers, a Commonwealth attorney
from the community and a member of the Citizen's Patriotic League
present that night, “Kenton County must be loyal and all pro-Germans
must go.”8
On the night of June 24, 1918, the Citizen's Patriotic League once
again went forth into the night to make the world unsafe for all things
deemed unAmerican. The League demanded support for the war from
Paul Flynn, a 55-year-old farmer who resided south of Covington. Flynn
was accosted for failing to give sufficiently to war drives and for failing to
buy war bonds. Flynn was whipped repeatedly by the League's members
until he agreed to buy $25 in US war bonds.9
In all these cases Stephen L. Blakely, attorney for the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, was present and actively involved in these
outbursts of mob violence. That the Commonwealth's attorney was
present is especially important in showing a tendency on the part of
8 Cincinnati Enquirer,  June 6, 1918 in archives ACLU archives,  reel 7 volume 60.
9 Cincinnati Enquirer,  June 25, 1918 in archives ACLU archives,  reel 7 volume 60.
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Kentucky officials to not only  ignore such outbursts of popular violence,
but to incite and lead them as well.10  
Roger Baldwin, founder of the American Civil Liberties Union,
produced an extensive correspondence with government officials on the
matter of the mob violence in the Covington area, especially the activity
of Blakely. The words of Governor R.C. Stanley at the time are telling:
“the governor has no right to indict or to impeach and, under the law and
Constitution of the State, until the civil authorities call upon the
Governor for assistance or until matters reach such a state as to justify
placing the particular community under martial law and the militia,
there is nothing the Governor can do in the premises.” As Governor
Stanley well knew, and as Baldwin found out, officials at the local level
were effectively insulated from officials at the Commonwealth level.
Kentucky's local politics were fundamentally in the hands of local
officials, who were only answerable to Commonwealth officials in the
most extreme circumstances.11 
In response to such an official attitude, ACLU supporter and
colleague of Baldwin, Edward F. Alexander, turned to other local officials
and wrote directly to the Ohio State District Attorney's Office in
Columbus, feeling that since the case involved the Cincinnati area, the
State District Attorney of Ohio might feel compelled to become involved.
10 ACLU archives, reel 5 volume 36.
11 Ibid.
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Not surprisingly, Ohio authorities were unwilling to interfere in an affair
that did not obviously involve their state.12 
Alexander also wrote to district attorneys in several northern
Kentucky counties on this matter. The Boone County District Attorney
maintained that “nothing had happened in his district.” The Kenton
County District Attorney did not respond to Alexander, in spite of the fact
that Bigelow's whipping was believed to have taken place within Kenton
County. Alexander also sought aid from the local Federal District
Attorney Thomas D. Slattery, who refused stating “unless evidence is
presented that Bigelow's abductors impersonated federal officers, [then
the] department cannot act.”13 
Alexander ultimately abandoned any hope of prosecuting Blakely,
writing:
I may say with all frankness, that we have no
confidence in the local authorities of Kenton and
Campbell Counties. I believe that we have
excellent grounds for this feeling. As to the
Kentucky Federal authorities, I believe they are
more or less indifferent with an unapparent
tendency to maintain that no Federal question is
presented. I do not think we should get very far
if we had to depend on Kentucky Federal
officials... to sum up we do not think that we
can get very far in this matter of an
investigation.14 
In no way was Blakely ever prosecuted or censured for his
activities by the state of Kentucky, nor was he indicted or otherwise
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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censured by federal officials. Most significantly, Blakely continued to
hold sway over the area both as a leader of mob activities and as a
district attorney. Given free reign by both state and federal officials,
Blakely is typical of the Kentucky local elites who held both their official
position and served informally as leaders of vigilante groups.
Perhaps the most telling aspect of this case as a barometer of the
general attitude of Kentuckians is a simple economic one. In spite of a
$500 reward for information on Mr. Bigelow’s attackers, no information
was ever volunteered. Kentuckians were either too afraid of his attackers
or too much in sympathy with them to provide information on Bigelow’s
attorneys.15
The attitude of Kentucky's citizens toward these activities is
revealed in the editorial pages of the area's newspapers. Few wrote to
condemn Blakely, but many were convinced Bigelow got what he
deserved.
A typical example is this letter to the editor:
Frequently the law moves altogether too slowly
to satisfy; but that is no reason why one should
take the law into one's hands. And Under the
cloak of so called free speech many decidedly
misguided individuals have substituted license
for freedom. Believe what you please have been
the warning of the government, but keep your
mouth shut. The trouble is that many cannot or
will not keep their mouths shut. That has been
the trouble with Preacher Bigelow. He spoke too
often both in defiance of Uncle Sam's warning.... 
15 Ibid.
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Wake up Uncle Sam before the nation
finds itself wrapped in strangulating coils.
Socialism is growing bolder socialism with
monstrous ideas and no less monstrous
teachings. Bigelow frankly admits the
horsewhipping has changed him -- for a time at
least --From an unresisting pacifists to a
prepared pacifist. Evidently the horsewhipping,
censurable as it was, has accomplished
something Non-resistance is mighty good in
theory – when applied ... it is different. 16
While on the one hand preferring that such outbursts not take place, the
author of this letter sympathizes with the vigilantes more than the
victim. Rather than advocating the free expression of minority opinions,
the speaker would rather have the government support such
vigilanteism. Within this populist view, the victim, Pastor Bigelow is by
no means innocent; instead, his opinions are deeply in error and require
punishment. Vigilantes, then, are merely doing the right thing, albeit in
the wrong way. 
The case of Kentucky Socialist Frank Lavanier provides a further
example of the ways in which Kentucky officials allowed vigilante justice
to be carried out in the Commonwealth. Lavanier was a member of the
Socialist party and was repeatedly harassed by individuals from the
District Attorney's office. Like Bigelow before him, in 1919 Lavanier was
accosted and threatened for his ‘dissident’ political views. As the original
affidavit sworn out by Lavanier states, he was threatened publicly by
Blakely and a mob with the words “if any of you S____ of B_____s of you
16 Cincinnati Enquirer [date illegible] clippings in ACLU archives, reel 5 volume 36.  
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Socialists and Bolshevists dare to hold a meeting in Covington we will
shoot the H____ out of ever d_____ one of you [edited in original].” Blakely
also demanded that Lavanier not only abate his political activities in the
area but also move out of the city.17  
Lavanier was a local pariah who was unpopular with Kentuckians
in the region and persecution of him served as a rallying cry for those
sympathetic to vigilante justice. Like others elsewhere in the state, he
was the target of mob violence which included the involvement of local
government officials. Again, by directing local feelings against the
perceived threat of radicalism, members of the local political leadership
were able to take charge of mob violence and direct these populist
energies away from reform and a more reasoned local politics and,
instead, direct them toward the paper tiger of domestic radicalism.18 
Similar are the cases of James Beeler and Edward Greoshel two
Louisville Socialists, who were placed in a similar situation in June
through August of 1918. Each of these men was harassed in Louisville
by mobs led by members of the district attorney's office.  Also, both
Beeler and Greoshel were prosecuted for political activities opposing to
the war. Again these cases, while offering less in the way of documentary
evidence, do show that the Commonwealth's politicians were willing to
lead mob activities within the state. Both men seemed unable to acquire
redress through the police but in each case the men were also the
17ACLU archives, reel 12 volume 92.
18 Ibid.
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victims of official government prosecution that coincided with the mob
attacks.19 
Other instances of officials and mobs conspiring against
individuals with nonconforming views took place throughout the state,
and victims included a pacifist in the north eastern Kentucky town of
Staffordsburg,20 a labor organizer in Jefferson County,21 several brewers
in the northern Kentucky area,22 and farmers in northern and eastern
Kentucky.23 In these and no doubt other instances, the elected officials of
the state used mob violence in ways that served to reinforce existing
political elites at the expense of those with unpopular political views. 
In all of these instances, officials used mob violence against
minority opinions in order to reinforce their local authority. In all cases
documented, wherever mob members were identified they included
locally appointed or elected officials. Only in cases where the mob victims
themselves were able to identify the perpetrators were any mob members
identified, and all official attempts to prosecute individual members
failed. In all of these cases there is a clear indication of willingness on the
part of officials to participate in local outbursts of mob violence.
 These activities are material to the Klan's development in
Kentucky. The Klan's usual claim that the ideological and legal climate of
19 ACLU archives, reel 2 volume 12
20 ACLU archives, reel 2 volume 12. Cincinnati Enquirer, August 13, 1918 page 4.  Cincinnati Times-Star,
May 20, 1918 page 8.
21 ACLU archives, reel 2 volume 12.
22 ACLU archives, reel 2 volume 12. Cincinnati Enquirer, August 13, 1918 page 4.
23 ACLU archives, reel 2 volume 12
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the time allowed 'unAmerican' ideas to flourish in 'typical' American
communities bore little resemblance to the reality in Kentucky. Clearly
communities in Kentucky developed a methodology for destroying and
rooting out those seen as radical, or atypical in their thinking. Kentucky
officials exploited this by at the very least turning a blind eye, and often
taking a leading role in such events in order to reinforce their existing
leadership positions within communities. Clearly the Klan could make no
claim that current politicians were deaf to the threat of radicalism and
'unAmerican activities' at the local level within the context of Kentucky.
Furthermore any such claims made by Klansmen would serve to
challenge established leadership. Thus the Klan could not effectively
demand a role in driving out subversives without undermining the role of
local elites. This was quite simply something local elites were unwilling to
accept. 
Kentucky was a remarkably friendly state for incumbent politicians
during the 1920s. Kentucky stands in particularly stark contrast
compared to neighbors. There the Klan influenced politics deeply and
dethroned established politicians, in contrast Kentucky’s politics show
no clear indication of such influence. 
Indeed, of the entire Kentucky congressional delegation, not one
individual failed to win re-election in the years from 1920 to 1928. In
1924 William Fields left congress to occupy the governor’s mansion, and
was replaced by his political heir and fellow Democrat Fred Vinson. In
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1926 three members of Kentucky's congressional delegation failed to run
again, all both due to death or failing health, and yet again in each case
the same party easily held the same seats.24  
The routine reelection of politicians very much speaks to the
stability of Kentucky's politics. While Kentucky's four neighboring states,
Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee, and West Virginia on average rejected nearly
27% of their congressional delegations over the same time period,
Kentuckians were returning 100% of theirs.
The Kentucky experience can usefully be compared with that of,
Indiana where the Klan was stronger during this decade than in any
other state. In 1924, the year the Klan was at the height of its power in
the Hoosier state, Indianans rejected a massive 45% of their state's
incumbent congressional delegation. Again, Kentucky returned its entire
incumbent slate of congressmen during the same period. Clearly, if
Indiana is any indication of the impact the Klan had on congressional
elections, it was no factor within the Commonwealth.25
Similarly, in nearby West Virginia, nearly 83% of then House
delegation was rejected by the people in 1924. On average West Virginia
would reject over half of all incumbent congressmen in any given election
throughout the 1920s.26 
24 William Tyler Page,  Statistics of the Congressional and Presidential Election 1920 page 5. Statistics of
the Congressional and Presidential Election 1922 page  5. Statistics of the Congressional and Presidential
Election  1924 page 7.  Statistics of the Congressional and Presidential Election 1926 page 7. Statistics of
the Congressional and Presidential Election  1928  page 9. Louisville Courier- Journal September 7, 1921
page 1.
25 Moore, 151-179.
26 Page, Clerk of the House of Representatives Statistics of the Congressional and Presidential Election
1920 page 11. Statistics of the Congressional and Presidential Election 1922 page  10. Statistics of the
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While the Klan itself became an issue in neighboring states in
these years, Kentucky's politicians were unique in their utter disregard
for the Klan as an issue during campaigning. Not one of Kentucky's
major candidates for the US House of Representatives or Senate made
mention of the Invisible Empire in any public campaign speeches
recorded during the era.27 
Indeed, such unwillingness of congressmen to go on record did not
go unnoticed. Yet, Kentucky's congressmen may have aspired to be more
than mere congressmen, and engaging an issue that mattered little at
home might hurt their chances were they to seek higher office, for little
apparent gain.28
In Presidential politics Kentucky was nearly evenly divided in both
1920 and 1924. Only in 1928 with the nomination of Al Smith, the first
Roman Catholic to run on a major party ticket would Kentucky favor one
candidate by a large majority. An analysis of these elections once again
shows a lack of Klan influence.
In 1920 the race between Senator Warren G. Harding and Ohio
governor James Cox, Kentuckians favored Cox by a razor thin majority of
only 4017 votes, a difference of less than one-half of one-percent of the
total votes cast within the Commonwealth.29 The machine nature of
Congressional and Presidential Election  1924 page 12.  Statistics of the Congressional and Presidential
Election 1926 page 12. Statistics of the Congressional and Presidential Election  1928  page 14.
27Louisville Courier-Journal, April 15, 1920-October 17, 1928. Of 68 articles on campaign speeches, none
include mention of the Klan.
28 Louisville Courier-Journal July 29, 1926 page 6. Dec 25, 1926 page 6. October 24, 1924 page 6. October
29, 1924 page 6. December 24 1924, page 6. 
29 Page,  Statistics of the Congressional and Presidential Election 1920 page 11.
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Kentucky politics is readily apparent in this instance, and while 71.2% of
eligible voters cast ballots that election, this may be as much an
indication of widespread voter fraud as of actual interest in politics. 30 
Four years later the state swung to the Republicans and a slim
plurality gave their votes to Calvin Coolidge. While Coolidge claimed the
state, it was not due to any significant successes by the Republican
machine within the state. Rather it was Progressive Robert La Follette
whose 38,465 votes prevented either candidate from achieving a clear
majority. Indeed had the La Follette votes gone to John Davis, the
Democratic candidate, the Democrat would have pulled away with a slim
majority as the party had in 1920. In the end, 24,111 votes, 3.2% of all
those cast, separated Coolidge and Davis.31 1924 marked the year of the
Klan’s greatest influence nationally. Yet while the Klan might be a force
in other states, Kentucky’s election results showed no major disruptions.
The Klan did play a very minor, if indirect role, in this election.
Leaders of Louisville's black community endorsed Davis for President
and suggested blacks abandon their traditional loyalties to the
Republican Party due to its associations with the Klan.32 
In 1928, however, events differed significantly, with the nomination
of Al Smith of New York, a 'wet' candidate in the era of Prohibition, and
the first Catholic candidate of any major party. In the wake of Smith's
30 Lowell H. Harrison, “Kentucky and Presidential Elections, 1912-1948” in Filson Club Historical
Quarterly, 26 (1952) 321-322.
31 Page,  Clerk of the House of Representatives Statistics of the Congressional and Presidential Election
1924 page 7. 
32 Louisville Courier Journal, page 9,  October 11, 1924. Lexington Leader,  October 11, 1924 page 7.
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nomination many Protestants who were usually Democrats abandoned
their party. The effect of Smith's Catholic faith combined with his anti-
Prohibition views led to his overwhelming defeat in Southern states,
Kentucky being only one. For the first time in a decade Kentucky swung
wildly in favor of one party, Hoover carried the Bluegrass state by a
margin of 176,994 votes of the almost one million cast. As in other
states, many voters simply stayed away from the polls. Anti-Catholic
tendencies were already common before the Klan appeared, as they
would remain after it vanished. While the Klan played upon these
tendencies elsewhere this was not he case in Kentucky.  The Klan
possessed no more of a monopoly on anti-Catholic prejudice than of anti-
Semitic or anti-black attitudes. The Klan merely reflected these
prejudices, it did not create them, and there is no evidence to support a
claim that the Klan was responsible for the great defeat of Smith in
Kentucky.33 
Nor was there evidence for Klan influence upon gubernatorial
elections. In politics at a state level, the governor’s mansion changed
political hands numerous times throughout the 1920s, but this was
identical to the state of the governorship in the 1930s and the 1940s as
well. Indeed in the first half of the 20th century, the governorship of
Kentucky changed hands every four years after 1907.Very commonly, as
in 1919, the incumbent governor simply lacked the political power to
33 Page, Statistics of the Congressional and Presidential Election 1924 page 10.
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reacquire his party's nomination. Indeed in a state divided into 120
counties, many or most of ruled by intensely local, oligarchic, cliques, it
should come as no surprise that holding an office requiring a state-wide
majority was difficult at best.  Congressmen, state assemblymen, and
mayors could rely on their continuing contact with local politicians to
ensure re-election. Governors and US Senators, dwelling primarily in
Frankfort or Washington, had little time to devote to developing the
myriad local contacts necessary to hold onto their offices, and instead
often lost touch with their political bases in their various home regions.34
While Congressmen serving in the US House may have had a more
difficult task than local assemblymen and mayors, the relatively small
regions they represented made it possible for them to maintain their hold
on power in a political system that was intensely local.
In the 1923 Governor’s race the Klan had not yet made any
impression on Kentucky. The contest of 1923 was primarily an issue of
personality. Yet regionalism and local interests also played a significant
part, and many if not most Kentuckians voted on the basis of local
political loyalties. Incumbents have historically fallen easy prey in
gubernatorial elections in the Commonwealth, and thus it was not
surprising when US Congressman William Fields defeated incumbent
Republican Edward Morrow in the fall of 1923.35
34 Klotter, 213-231, 284.
35 Klotter, 272-275. Louisville Courier-Journal,  November, 9 1923 Page 1. Lexington Leader, November,
9 1923 page 1.
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Fields was among Kentucky's most ambitious governors of the
twentieth century, and proposed a plan which would have eliminated the
state's $6 million debt, built new asylums and hospitals, and, most
significantly, provided over $50 million for road construction. Fields
proposed a bond initiative to total $75 million to fund these various
expenses, to be paid for primarily by gas taxes, automobile registration
fees, and an increase in property taxes.36
 The bond became a ballot issue in the fall of 1924, and also a
virtual referendum on the governorship of Fields. The plan drew the ire of
both fiscal conservatives and newspapers, with the Lexington Leader and
the Courier-Journal agreeing for perhaps the only time in the decade.
Critics saw the plan as too ambitious, and rejected it out of hand. Only
the Lexington Herald supported the measure and even then half
heartedly. Likewise most of Kentucky's political bosses did not trust
Fields, and failed to give him their support. The measure was defeated by
nearly 100,000 votes and came as a serious blow to Fields's political
prestige, one he never fully recovered from.37
The gubernatorial election of 1927 was a contest between Fields,
who was still reeling from the defeat of the bond issue, and Republican
Flem Sampson, Chief Justice of the state's highest court. Field's defeat
on bond issue in 1924 was brought up as a constant reminder of his
inability to achieve real success as governor. The other major issue
36 Klotter, 275-285.
37 Louisville Courier-Journal, 19, 22-29. February 1924 Lexington Herald, February  9, 22, 22-28 1924,
March 5, 25; November 5 1924; Lexington Leader, November 5 1924
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became not roads, the Klan, or education, but whether pari-mutuel
betting would remain legal at Kentucky racetracks. Amidst widespread
voter fraud Sampson defeated Fields, by nearly 32,000 votes. Once again
the governor's mansion changed hands after only four years,  and once
again there was indication of voter fraud, but no trace of the Klan as an
issue.38 
Issues mattered little in the campaigns for governor during this
era, and most contests seemed determined more by personal loyalties
than by any actual issues in the state. In both the 1923 and 1927
elections all candidates were dry.39 
Elections for US Senator were little different in Kentucky than
those for governor. Augustus Stanley was the incumbent in 1924, and
ran against republican challenger Frederic Sackett. Sackett, a war hero,
won based primarily on his contacts with local county party bosses.
Once again, in a contest that focused on issues of personality and the
ability to appeal to local oligarchs’ interests, the incumbent proved
unable to hold onto office.40
Similarly, in the 1926 US senate race incumbent Republican
Richard Ernst was defeated by Democratic challenger Alben Barkley.
Like Stanley, Ernst was unable to maintain his political connections in
the commonwealth, and additionally was too weak in health to campaign
38 Klotter, 286-288 Lexington Herald,  November 8-12, 1927 page 2.  Louisville Courier-Journal,
December 2, 1927. New York Times, October 26, 1927.
39 Klotter, 27-276, 286.
40 Klotter, 281-285.
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effectively. Barkley's victory was the continuation of a prevalent theme in
Kentucky politics at this time, that any office which required a statewide
majority was easily captured, but difficult to retain.41
Throughout the 1920s these same patterns reigned throughout
Kentucky's politics. Local officials up to congressmen were able to hold
onto local powerbases, but those seeking statewide office, from governor
to senator, proved unable to hold onto the local power bases that were so
crucial to keeping elected office. It was not until 1932 that an incumbent
Kentucky US Senator would win re-election in this century. Little
kingdoms and coalitions of kingdoms were what determined Kentucky's
politics at a state level. 
In urban politics Kentucky was dominated by traditional ‘urban
bosses. In rural areas, bosses also reigned supreme, often based in
county seats. The line between these two types of bosses is oftentimes
fuzzy, as evidenced by the commonly held title of 'city boss' for
Frankfort’s powerful Percy Haley.
In Lexington, Billy Klair ruled the city as a machine boss from
1900 until his death in 1937. Klair, the son of German immigrants and a
Catholic was naturally hostile to the Klan, and in any case saw no reason
to allow a potentially disruptive organization into his city. Klair’s
personal animosity toward the Klan, born out of his heritage and faith,
41 Klotter, 282-285. Louisville Courier-Journal, March 20-21 1926 page 2. September, 22 1926 page 2. 
42
did much to discourage the Klan from rising in the city to any large
degree.42 
From 1912 until 1931 Lexington's city government was run on a
city commission basis that kept power in the hands of a variety of elected
officials. Thus Klair was able to sit on the state's railroad commission,
serve as a legislator, and later hold no political office at all, while
retaining complete control of local events. No one commission member
held enough power to challenge Klair, and those who fell out of line were
quickly replaced. Klair was “undisputed czar of Lexington politics” and
had no reason to turn to the Klan for support.43
Similar situations prevailed in other cities, with Michael Brennan,
running Louisville, and Maurice Galvin holding a similar position in
Covington. Even little Frankfort had its own boss, Percy Haley. In each of
these cases a local oligarch ruled the city in Tammany Hall fashion.
Relying heavily on patronage and graft, these men ruled in a way not
unlike the rural elites.
 Only two factors separated these men from rural bosses. One was
the hereditary position of rural elites, who often relied on bonds of
kinship to maintain power. Kentucky's urban bosses were all 'new men,'
without such ties. A secondly factor was a Catholic faith which remained
a serious political liability throughout the first half of the 20th century in
42 Bolin, xv, 31-75.
43 Bolin, xv.  Klotter 193-194, 205, 226, 274, 276-277, 285-286, 294, 297, 304-306.
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rural Kentucky. Other than these there was little difference between the
ways urban and rural ruled. 44
Ben Johnson of Bardstown is typical of the rural oligarchs who
tightly controlled influence and power in the 'little kingdoms.' Johnson’s
father had held several hundred slaves, and Johnson sat for over 20
years in the US congress. As Johnson approached the end of his political
career in the 1930s he handed over the reins of power to his son, who
had been groomed for such a position for a number of years. Up until the
day of his death “Boss Ben” Johnson ruled Nelson County without real
opposition, handing out favors to those he liked, and destroying those
who opposed him.45 
Voting in most of Kentucky at this time was dominated by vote
buying and fraud. Prices varied from one dollar per vote to $7.50. In one
especially close race in 1904 votes sold for the then exorbitant price of
$20 each. Nor was the dead vote neglected as a means of boosting a
candidate’s turn out.46 
Blacks, who made up a relatively small segment of the
Commonwealth's population at 11.4%, were, according to Klotter, as
likely to sell votes as any other group. While occasional talk of
44Bolin, xi-xv 20-37. Klotter, 193-194, 209, 212, 304,  224,  266, 268, 274, 277, 285, 294, 304, 306 -307,
318. Ireland 142-150.
45Sarah Smith, Historic Nelson County (Louisville: Gateway Press, 1971) 384-388.
46 Klotter, 195-201. J.A. Richards, A History of Bath County Kentucky (Yuma, Arizona,
Southwest Press, 1961). 
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disenfranchisement was not unheard of, no serious efforts were made to
eliminate black suffrage in Kentucky.47
Clearly, Kentucky’s bosses had a tight grip on power, and moved
against any forces that threatened that hold on politics. Yet the Klan
represented a real threat. Its ability to mobilize popular discontent could
have represented a real danger to their hold on political power. It also
threatened their role as vigilante leaders. 
The Klan failed to arrive in Kentucky until 1923. Elites in
Indiana, Ohio, and other states allowed the Klan to grow strong from
1919 to 1921 when it was under relatively the apolitical leadership of
Simmons. The Klan of 1922 and on was lead by Hiram Evans who
openly flaunted the Klan’s political power. When the Klan arrived in
Kentucky, it was obvious that it had a political agenda that was not
present earlier. This proved a critical distinction between the growth of
the Klan in Kentucky and elsewhere. Clearly the leaders of Kentucky’s
many small counties and its few cities had the power to stifle such a
threat. After 1922 they would have the motivation. 
47US Census Bureau Statistical Abstract of the United States 1920, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1921) 40. Klotter 195-201.
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Chapter 3: The Klan and Politics
The Ku Klux Klan of Kentucky never grew into the major
organization that was seen in states such as Ohio, Michigan, and
Indiana. Nor did it even grow to moderate size and influence of the
Klans in neighboring Tennessee and West Virginia.  For Kentucky the
question is not ‘why did the Klan succeed here?’ but rather 'why did
the Klan not succeed there when it claimed so much success in
neighboring states?' The reasons for this include a variety of
conditions and developments that rendered Kentucky separate and
unique from its neighbors. While similar to Tennessee, Ohio, West
Virginia, and Indiana, in many respects Kentucky is unique and
important differences are at the heart of the Klan's relative lack of
success in the Commonwealth compared with its popularity in nearby
areas. 
Kentuckians generally accepted fraternal organizations, even
relatively new ones. The American Legion, an organization which
originally had many features that paralleled those of the Klan, had
little difficulty in recruiting many members there, and Kentuckians
were among the most effective fund raisers in the Legion’s ranks.
Likewise Kentucky was home to innumerable Rotarians, Elks lodges,
Masons, and Shriners.1
As has been noted by a number of historians, documentary
evidence for the Klan has often times been scant. In the particular
1Louisville Courier-Journal, December 30, 1917 Page 6 section 2.  Thomas D. Clark, The Southern
Country Editor (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Co, 1948), 33-74
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case of Kentucky the lack of evidence is made even worse by a
tradition in the early part of the twentieth-century of deliberate
destruction of records on the part of clerks,2 likely in order prevent
possible prosecutions of local political officials for illicit activity. In this
examination of the Klan such sources as pamphlets, newspapers, and
similar items have been used extensively. The Klan of Kentucky itself
left few official records, and many of the primary sources that do exist
are often so incomplete as to render them functionally useless.
Nevertheless, some documentary evidence is available and is useful
for presenting a view of the Klan and its activities.
While some local newspapers have been preserved, most
Kentucky papers from this era have not been, and this makes the role
of the Leader and the Courier-Journal particularly important.
Additional periodicals from New York, and elsewhere occasionally
made references to the Klan's Kentucky branch, and provide further
documentary evidence to corroborate information regarding the Klan
in the state. 3  Other documents are available as well, such as
speeches, pamphlets and other materials, both in favor of and in
opposition to the Invisible Empire. These too serve to shed light on the
trials and tragedies of the Klan in Kentucky. 
The second Ku Klux Klan, founded in Atlanta in 1915, did
not spread to Kentucky until several years later. The first reference to
this revived order anywhere within the Commonwealth occurs in the
2 Robert Ireland, Little Kingdoms (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1977), 145-147.
3 George C. Wright, Racial Violence in Kentucky, 1865-1940 (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana
press, 1990), 328-329.
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December 30, 1917, issue of the Louisville Courier-Journal. The
editorial staff wrote a scathing condemnation of the first and second
Klans which focused especially on their extralegal activities. While this
article acknowledged the popular understanding of the first Klan, that
it was a 'necessity' in dealing with post-Civil War chaos, editors are
quick to point out that Kentucky, never had a Reconstruction
government, had little if any need for the methods or behaviors
associated with the first Ku Klux Klan. Likewise, the editorial staff saw
little need for the revived Klan.4 
The Lexington Leader, which was noteworthy for its opposition
to the Courier-Journal throughout the era, was tentatively pro-Klan.
Thus when the Klan marched through Mount Sterling, the Courier-
Journal reported only 100 marchers at a Klan gathering, emphasizing
the small nature of the actual march. The Leader however placed the
emphasis on the alleged 10,000 viewers of the parade, and the “good
time had by all” while also, almost in passing, recording the number
of marchers at 100.5
Indeed the Leader was often overzealous in its treatment of the
Klan. In the Mount Sterling meeting there were allegedly 100
observers for each Klansmen. In a similar event in Richmond, Indiana,
6,000 Klansmen drew only 30,000 other attendees, a ratio of 5 to 1.6
Thus it is unlikely that all of the Leader’s figures are accurate, but
4 Louisville Courier-Journal, March 8, 1925 page 1.
5 Lexington Leader, June 11, 1924 page 8. Louisville Courier Journal, June 8, 1924 page 7.
6 Richard Forstall, Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 2000 (Washington:
Population Division US Bureau of the Census, 1997), 1.  Lexington Leader, June 11, 1924 page 8.
Louisville Courier Journal, June 8, 1924 page 7. Moore, 122.
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they do show a clear bias which favored of the Klan.
Emphasizing different aspects of the organization and its
activities, the anti-Klan Courier-Journal and pro-Klan Leader tell
different stories. The Courier-Journal's tale is one of a failing,
floundering Klan unable to hold or attract members. That of the
Leader is a different account entirely, one focused on the excitement
and crowds surrounding the Klan's gatherings. While the Leader's
figures for Klansmen are in accord with the number given in the
Courier-Journal, the Leader focuses instead on the crowds gathered at
processions, and the 'orderly' and 'exciting' nature of the parades of
Klansmen. Where there are no crowds or the Klan is unwanted the
Leader emphasizes the unruly nature of counter demonstrators or
their illegal activities. A typical story from the Leader remarks on the
5,000 attendees at the funeral of a Klansman slain in a gun battle
with bootleggers. The article which concerns a man in New York is a
tribute to the bravery and honesty for which the Klan supposedly
stood. The Leader also ran a weekly feature in the Sunday edition on
the nature of God by 'One Hundred Percent Americans' throughout
the period, a clear use of Klan symbolism. Similarly, when describing
clashes between the Catholic anti-Klan organization the Knights of the
Flaming Circle and the Klan of Ohio, the Klan is portrayed as the
victim of aggression. The reader is lead to believe the Klan's successes
have evoked the ire of Ohio's Catholics. 7 
 Only with the Klan’s apparent inability to deal with its own
7Lexington Leader May 23, 1924 page 9. June 22, 1924 page 7. August 5, 1924 page 7.
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difficulties nationally in 1925 and 1926 did the Klan become less
favored in the pages of the Leader. While some other Kentucky
newspapers are persevered most have not survived. However by
contrasting accounts from the Leader and Courier-Journal, a balanced
look at the Klan can be achieved.  
Regardless of sources, no single answer can suffice to explain
the Klan's lack of success in Kentucky. Rather a range of different
causes and factors were at play. The conditions prevalent throughout
Kentucky at this time combined with various ill-timed and ill-
conceived Klan activities to make the Klan a much smaller influence
in Kentucky than in neighboring environments.
In part the Klan's lack of success can be attributed to its
inability to acquire a foothold in the largest city within Kentucky. The
story of the Klan in Louisville is one quite different from that of the
Klan in nearby Indianapolis. While the Klan there succeeded, grew,
and indeed became a bastion of power within the state, the Klan never
had such success in Kentucky's largest city, in spite of Louisville
being an early target of Klan recruiters.8  
Klan recruitment drives followed a set pattern, usually opening
with a speaking engagement at a local theater, church, or fraternal
lodge. There, a speaker, invariably a 'Doctor,'  'Reverend,' or
'evangelist,' would deliver a sermon on the principles of the Klan, often
tailored specifically to the local audience. These engagements might go
on for several consecutive nights. After this, the Klan would accept
8 Jackson, 235-307. Moore, 7, 8, 16, 25, 61-62, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 100, 103, 104, 107.
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applications for membership. Once the Klan was sufficiently
organized, and elected officers, the speaker would move into another
location and repeat the process. 
While in other instances the Klan used existing fraternal lodges
and bodies to promote itself, these events are nearly impossible to
document in Kentucky. However, had the Klan used such means in
Kentucky there would likely be more accounts of the Invisible Empire
within the state. In any event the utter lack of Klan documents makes
it impossible to compare Klan membership to lodge membership.
The first attempt at organizing in Louisville came in the fall of
1921, amidst the furor of the campaign for mayor. Blacks, after years
of neglect by Republican allies, turned away from the party they had
supported since the Civil War. Progressive members of the city's black
community formed an independent local party, the Lincoln
Independent Party.9  Such a development threatened to upset
traditional voting patterns. This was especially significant in a city
where blacks made up well over a quarter of the population.. Together
with immigrants these two minorities made up slightly over half of the
cities residents.10
At the same time Klan speaker Dr. G.S. Long requested
permission from the city's Board of Public Safety to speak. In a city
where the majority of adults were either blacks or immigrants the
9 George C. Wright “Black Political Insurgency in Louisville, Kentucky: The Lincoln Independent
Party of 1921” in The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 68, No. 1. (Winter, 1983), 8-23.
10 Statistical Abstract of the United State 1920, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1921)
50-51.
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combination of an independent black party and an alienated
immigrant population did not bode well for the continued viability of
Louisville's established machine boss Mickey Brennan. Thus
incumbent Republican mayor George Smith, a Brennan lieutenant,
ordered the city Board of Public Safety to bar Long from speaking in a
move to curry favor with black, immigrant, and Catholic voters. While
the Klan would loudly protest this decision, it was never overturned,
and throughout the decade Klansmen and Klan meetings simply were
not seen in Louisville.11 This event was critical in the development of
the Klan within the Commonwealth. For while the Klan in neighboring
Indiana used Indianapolis as the hub of its activities, the Klan in
Kentucky would be unable to organize in Louisville. This marks a
critical difference between the two states and may explain differences
in Klan development.12
The Klan speaker, however, had not initially chosen Louisville
as the focus for his recruiting activities. Rather Dr. Long, a dentist
who initially hailed from Oklahoma, had come to the region to find
recruits among Indiana's many white Protestant communities along
the Ohio River, a region where the Klan was already growing rapidly.13
Louisville, a large city for that time, sat just across the river from the
Hoosier state. Given his proximity to so many potential Klansmen,
Long would have been foolish to have ignored this potential recruiting
ground. A long drawn out struggle in court over the right to speak in
11 Louisville Courier-Journal, September 16, 1921 page 8. Middlesboro Daily News, Sept 21, 1921
page 1.
12 Moore, 7-8, 16, 25, 61-62, 81-86, 100-107.
13Louisville Courier-Journal, September 16, 1921. Middlesboro Daily News, Sept 21, 1921 page 1.
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the city would have meant significant legal costs and much time for
recruiting lost. Since Kleagles (Klan recruiters) were paid on a per
capita basis, a recruiter turned away from the potentially lucrative,
but now closed city of Louisville, would most likely have turned to the
closest area known to yield many recruits. He would have returned to
Indiana. Louisville represented potential, but Indiana represented
known profitability. 
Yet Long was unwilling to abandon Louisville completely. When
Long did speak, it was in the Louisville suburb of Jeffersonville,
Indiana. Of the over 600,000 residents of Louisville, 200 attended, a
total which includes 4 uniformed Louisville police, sent to 'observe' the
meeting. The message was unmistakable; the Klan was not welcome
in Louisville. The political leadership found it potentially divisive. The
people, so few of whom dared to venture out, were either fearful or
uninterested.14
While Mayor Smith lost re-election it was due to charges of
embezzling over $10,000 in city funds, and not any sort of backlash
from barring the Klan. Incumbent mayors have traditionally fared
poorly and only one Louisville mayor in the twentieth century won
consecutive terms. Mickey Brennan came to terms with the new
mayor and retained his power as boss in spite of the setback.  Thus
Louisville remained an anomaly among Southern cities for its hostility
to the Klan.15 
It also is unlikely that Louisville residents were inclined to cross
14Louisville Courier-Journal, September 18, 1921 page 4. Moore, 57-58.
15 Klotter, 193-194, 209, 212, 304.
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the border and join the Klan in neighboring Indiana, for Jeffersonville
and Clark County, home to most of Louisville's Indiana suburbs,
contained fewer Klansmen than similar urban areas in northern
regions of Indiana. If anything, the shadow of Louisville was stifling
the Klan across the water.16
As Moore, Lutholtz, and Jackson have shown, the Klan's urban
chapters were a key to its success. Moore and Jackson in particular
have shown that the Indianapolis Klan's large size was a key to its
popularity in the state as a whole. Minorities (blacks and immigrants)
made up over half the population of Louisville, unlike Indianapolis,
where native born whites made up 75% of the population.17 Without a
similar stronghold in Kentucky, the Klan success here was critically
limited. Furthermore, Kleagles had little reason to venture into such a
hostile environment when nearby Indiana offered nearly limitless
possibilities. Indeed, no major Klan activity occurred again in or near
Louisville until 1923.18 
Court records indicate that the Klan did not attempt any
membership drive anywhere within Kentucky during the rest of 1921,
nor in 1922. It was a full two years after the recruitment drive in
Louisville before the Klan resurfaced in the Commonwealth.19
When the Klan did resurface it did so meekly. The Klan's only
activities in 1923 were failed attempts to raise chapters in Paducah,
16Moore, 57-58.
17 Statistical Abstract of the United State 1920,  51.
18 Lutholtz, 33-47. Moore, 7, 8, 16, 25, 61-62, 81-86, 100-107, 191. Jackson, 235-49.   
19Albert v. KKK Fayette County Circuit,  9427, 11 (Fayette District Court 1925). Albert v. KKK 345
(US Federal Court Eastern District Kentucky, 1925).
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Richmond, Mayfield, and Louisville. In each case organizers from
Indiana or Ohio were prevented by officials and police from organizing
local Klans.
In Richmond the Klan organizer was charged with attempting to
“arouse discord, strife and ill feeling between different classes of
persons.” The organizer was Ohio native C.F. Acker, who was arrested
for violating Kentucky’s “Criminal Syndicalism law.” This law was
originally intended to outlaw labor organizations, including the IWW,
and the Socialist and Communist parties. However, in Richmond it
was used to target the Klan as well.20  
In Louisville Klan speaker, E.H. Lougher, was denied permission
to speak by city officials. Unlike Long, Lougher ignored the ruling of
the Board of Public Safety but was quickly arrested. At the scene of
Lougher's planned engagement, police threatened openly to use tear
gas and fire fighters assembled ready to use hoses to dispel crowds.
While the Klan might protest the treatment as unfair, real efforts to
promote the Klan in the city were discouraged and would not come
again until 1928.21
In Paducah the Klan's organization efforts met once again with
official hostility. Paducah sits along the Ohio River in far western
Kentucky and like Louisville lies just south of Indiana. Just as in
Louisville, the Klan attempted to organize, and was once again denied
permission by the city officials to hold any meeting in the city.22 
20 ACLU archives reel 33 volume 242. Paducah News Democrat, September 19, 1923 page 1-2.
21Paducah News Democrat, September 22, 1923 page 1.  Louisville Courier-Journal, September 22,
1923  page 3. E.H. Lougher, The Kall of the Klan in Kentucky (Ku Klux Klan Press, 1924), 66.
22 Paducah News Democrat, November 2, 1923 page 2.
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Mobs were another means of dealing with the Klan, and when
led by elites represented a tradition in some areas. In Mayfield,
Kentucky, on August 26, 1923, H. Barber, a Kleagle was ordered to
leave the city by a “committee of citizens.” This committee included at
least several members of county government, including the sheriff.
Barber was forced out of town without being allowed to hold any
meetings or other attempt to set up a local Klan. This again
represented a further example of the efforts of ruling elites to
undermine the Klan's appeal as a vigilante organization by taking on
leadership positions with mob violence. When the Klan did arrive and
attempt to organize in spite of this resistance a year later, the Kleagle
were arrested on charges of speeding.23 
All these events took place in August and September of 1923,
and the Klan could not have timed their efforts more poorly. As the
Klan was attempting to organize in the Commonwealth, it was drawing
national attention for its efforts in Oklahoma. There, following
outbursts of violence against Jews and blacks in Tulsa, Governor
Walton declared martial law throughout the state.  Headlines across
the nation screamed of the imminent civil war brewing in the Sooner
state. Walton even went so far as to prevent the legislature from
meeting. Armed Klansmen and militia marched through the streets of
Oklahoma City. While the governor was ultimately impeached for his
heavy handed methods of dealing with mob violence the effect,
throughout the fall was pronounced. The Klan had clearly not brought
23 New York World, August 27, 1923. Lexington Leader, August 17, 1924 page 8.
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anything like the law and order it espoused to Oklahoma.24
In such an environment, with the Klan grabbing headlines
nationally and bringing a state to the brink of civil war, recruitment
proved difficult elsewhere. To politicians the dangers of disturbances
such as the ones in Oklahoma were clear. To the dry and law abiding
citizens of Kentucky, the Klan represented not law and order, but
anarchy and chaos. 
In 1924 the Klan made its next efforts at recruitment in the
Commonwealth. While Kleagles had been rebuffed in Kentucky in
1921 and 1923 they might easily have returned to Ohio or Indiana
and found a healthy following of new recruits there. Yet by 1924 the
Klan had reached its pinnacle in those states, and Kleagles, in order
to find fresh recruits turned to Kentucky with greater force than in
either 1921 or 1923. They would continue to meet with a resistance
that was every bit as vehement and insurmountable as in previous
years. While the relatively pro-Klan Lexington Leader boasted of the
Klan's 450,099 new members recruited nationally from July 1923 to
August 1924, it admitted that Kentucky's share was a scant 538.25
Community leaders used a variety of methods to deal with the
Klan, from simply withholding speaking permits as had been done in
Louisville and Paducah earlier, to banning the wearing of masks, and
some turned to even more direct and violent means. 
Several cities turned to anti-mask ordinances as a means of
24 Chalmers, 49-55. Paducah News-Democrat, September 11, 1923 page 1. September 16, 1923 page 1.
September  19, 1923 page 1.  Louisville Courier-Journal, September 16 Page 1. 
25Lexington Leader, May 16, 1924 page 10. 
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repelling Klan activities. Lexington led the way by passing an anti-
mask ban in March of 1924.26In Danville and Owensboro, ordinances
were passed banning the wearing of masks in public in the spring and
summer of 1924. Pineville also did so, although whether before or
after these other Kentucky towns is unknown, but certainly before
1927 when the state court of appeals upheld the legality of this law.
The Commission Human Rights, in its report in 1981 freely admitted
that many communities may have passed ordinances in the 1920s
and later that have been largely forgotten. 27
In the town of Middlesboro, Kentucky, a simpler solution was
found in merely charging any robed Klansmen with “Disorderly
Conduct.”28 At the time of arrest, the Klansmen were made to remove
their masks and other regalia, which served the dual purposes of both
humiliating the Klansmen and revealing their identities. 
Judges could be lenient toward those locals duped by the Klan,
even if they were not so with the outside Klan organizers. In February
of  1924,  L.M.  Ketcham,  Klan  organizer  from  Indiana,  and  several
associates burned a cross in London, Kentucky. Ketcham was fined
and served time for contempt of court for refusing to give the names of
Klansmen to Circuit Judge A.T. Manning. At most, ten Klansmen were
present at the burning of the cross and all except Ketcham, stated
that they had joined “a klan for law enforcement...  but not the Ku
26Harrodsburg Herald, March 7, 1924 page 1.
27The Ku Klux Klan Can't Hide Its Face Behind Bedsheets in these Kentucky Cities and Counties: A
Compilation of Anti-Mask Ordinances in Kentucky Communities, (Louisville : Kentucky Commission
on Human Rights, 1981). 1 
28 Louisville Courier-Journal, July 10, 1924 page 5. Middlesboro Daily News, July 10 Page 1.
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Klux Klan.” Ketcham himself  was arraigned 45 times by the judge,
and spent 56 consecutive days in jail, each arraignment leading to a
30 hour jail sentence for contempt of court. The judge accepted the
rather  flimsy  excuses  of  the  London  Klansmen,  but  Ketcham's
punishment  was  severe.  While  the  Klan  may  have  continued  its
activities in London, there is no evidence for it having done so, and
given  the  hostility  toward  Ketcham  for  the  relatively  minor  act
involved,  it  is doubtful that others would have eagerly followed his
example. 29
To assure the expulsion of Klan influence Judge Manning
required all potential jurors to state their affiliation, or lack there of,
with the Klan. In doing so, he compromised the most central tenet of
Klan membership, secrecy. Furthermore, as any active Klansmen were
prevented from jury service he removed the Klan's potential, so often
suggested in other areas of the country, to influence juries. In doing
so very publicly the judge struck out at the influence of the Klan
throughout a three county region.30  
A variety of other legal means could also target Klansmen. At
the Klan’s attempted rally in Somerset Klansmen were surprised to
learn that under city laws only law enforcement personnel were
allowed to direct traffic. Several Klansmen were arrested, and the rally
ended in disarray.31
Different communities might also interact to prevent the Klan
29Lexington Leader, March 16, 1924 page 1. March 30 page 8.
30 Louisville Courier-Journal, June 2, 1924, page 4. Lexington Leader, June 2, 1924 page 7.
31Lexington Leader, August 21, 1924, page 12. September 9, 1924 page 12.
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from developing. On June 30, 1924 the Klan cancelled its planned
speaking engagement to be held in the Cheapside section of
Lexington. While the Lexington Leader reports the cancellation was
due to a schedule conflict with another speaking engagement in New
York. In reality Lougher had to appear before a Louisville court the
same day. While the scheduling might be coincidence it seems likely
that Louisville’s court dates were influenced by Lexington’s politics. 32
Ideologies could often mix when dealing with the Klan and in
Central City, in the West Kentucky coal fields near Indiana, Mayor
Lonnie Jackson attacked the Klan and forbid its meeting. In doing so
Jackson spoke not only as mayor but “As president of the United Mine
Workers of America, District No. 231.” This event also shows the
hostility of organized labor toward the Klan. The UMWA forbade
members from joining the Klan, and the Klan's opposition to this and
other unions would do little to endear it to workers.33 
Klan recruiters nearly always came in from bordering states
where they had met more success and less resistance than in
Kentucky. These efforts focused on communities along Kentucky’s
borders, areas adjacent to already existing Klans. Few, however, got
far beyond the border communities. Typical of this are events in June
1924.
In Flemingsburg, a town less than 20 miles from the Ohio
border, the Klan demonstrated and later that same month it did so in
Middletown, near the Indiana-Kentucky border, Klansmen met at the
32Lexington Leader, June, 29, page 12. June 30, 1924 page 12.
33 New York Call, August, 26 1923 page 9.
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same time. Both communities sit only a few miles from the Tennessee-
Kentucky border.34
 In Newport, Kentucky, Klansmen burned a cross in front of the
town's First Baptist Church, less than a mile from where US Route 27
crosses into Newport from Cincinnati. While fifty Klansmen were
present, and the display was reported as 'orderly' the fact this event
occurred so close to Ohio, makes it doubtful that the Klansmen
involved were Kentuckians, but more likely, residents of Ohio. In May
a similar incident took place in Harlan, in Eastern Kentucky near
West Virginia.35 A week later Klansmen were released from county jail
in Denver, Kentucky, a town located near Inez and the West Virginia-
Kentucky border. These Klansmen were imprisoned for disturbing the
peace during a scuffle involving members of the Knights of
Columbus.36 
Klansmen even brought gifts at some of these cross-border
events. A church in Owenton on April 26 received an undetermined
amount.  The Klan also paid a church debt of $1,000 owed by a
church in Augusta, Kentucky, another city on the Ohio-Kentucky
border. Yet little else is known of these events, and these churches did
not become later centers of Klan activity.37
 The Klan eventually learned such events might be difficult after
the stiff resistance they began to meet in places like London, Central
City, and Maysfield. Cross burning represented a means of displaying
34Lexington Leader, June 8, 1924 page 6. June 27, 1924.
35Harlan Enterprise, Friday May 11, 1923 page 1. Lexington Leader March 25, page 2.
36 Louisville Courier-Journal, March 31, 1924 page 5. Lexington Leader, March 31, 1924 page 1.
37Lexington Leader. June 17, 1924 page 12.
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Klan presence without a prolonged appearance. A cross could be
prepared in advance, brought to a sight and then lit as the Klan left
the location. Such an attempt could give the false impression a local
Klan existed when in fact it did not. In Elkton, Kentucky, along the
Tennessee-Kentucky border crosses were burned in August of 1924.
Yet, no Klan meetings, gatherings or other activities are recorded in
Elkton before or after the event. Clearly if this was outside
interference from Tennessee it was short lived, and if the Klan was
local, no other activities are recorded.38
Resistance to the Klan could also employed more informal
means. In Brooksville, a hamlet ten miles south of the Ohio-Kentucky
border, anti-Klan forces left nails and tacks strewn on roads leading
from a Klan meeting place. Numerous Klansmen's automobiles were
damaged in the event, but the message, while simply sent, was clear.
An almost identical incident happened in Russellville, a town on the
Tennessee line, later than month. In Williamstown, twenty miles south
of Indiana, the Klan was not subjected to destroyed tires, but was
pelted with rotten eggs. The assailants in all these cases were never
found39
Some churches also put up resistance to the Klan. Kentucky's
organized religious bodies were apparently largely anti-Klan from such
records as have survived. The Southern Methodist Episcopal Church's
Kentucky meeting passed a measure denouncing the KKK as an
organization promoting race hatred. SME Church, a mostly white
38Lexington Leader, August 3, 1924 page 6.
39Lexington Leader, June 8 1924 page 6.  June 22, 1924 page 6. June 25, 1924 page 6.
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denomination, was a leading church in the Commonwealth and serves
well as an example of official religious attitudes toward Kentucky. The
SME Church did acknowledge and approve of racial segregation at the
meeting, but yet still saw the Klan as a divisive issue harmful to its
congregations. Clearly the rejection was not of racism itself but of the
Klan specifically. 40 
Likewise the state Bar Association condemned the Klan, both for
its actions outside the law and its prejudicial views. Indeed, the
speaker at the Bar Association’s 1923 meeting in Covington rightly
saw the Klan as a modern expression of the same impulses present in
the Know Nothing Party, an organization he also condemned.41  
Still in spite of the Klan's failure to organize, its potential as a
means to political advancement was not lost on aspiring politicians. In
a machine-based system, advancement came quickly for some and not
for others. Those unable to work within the system saw the Klan as a
means of easy political success. Here, as in Indiana, relative outsiders
sought to use the Klan to break into a tightly closed political system. 
One such example was in Princeton, Kentucky. While the only
documented such occurrence, it serves as an example of what
happened to those who used the Klan to advance their political
careers in the Commonwealth. In Caldwell County the local political
elite, like elites throughout the United States, wholeheartedly ignored
40Louisville Courier-Journal, September 25, 1924 page 3. Lexington Leader, September 25, 1924 page
1 section 2.
41John F. Hager Lawless Liberty Automatically Becomes Tyranny Address Delivered at Annual Meeting
of Kenton County Bar Association, at Covington, December 15, 1923 by of Ashland, Kentucky,
University of Kentucky Archives, 7.
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the prohibition laws. The Klan within the community then began a
concerted effort toward eliminating such violations of these statutes.
In this instance Abe Morse, city attorney, led the Klan in its efforts at
establishing a new political order for the county.
Morse had run for county judge and lost against M.T. Smith the
previous year.42 However, Morse saw the Klan as a potential tool in his
struggle for political power. Morse and other Klan members repeatedly
provided alcohol to various politicians throughout the county.
Afterward the Klansmen signed sworn statements against the
entrapped officials. Eight warrants were sworn out against Judge
Smith, three against chief of police Charles Martin, three against
Commonwealth's Attorney T.C. Bennet, one each to Sheriff Henry
Towery and Deputy Sheriff Sid Cantrill, and a startling twenty-two
against Deputy Circuit Clerk Garrard H. Barnes. Eventually over 109
individuals were charged before the end of the Klan's sweep of the
county.43 
However, the drive of Morse and Door to unseat the political
elite of Princeton and Caldwell County ultimately failed. In June of
1924 the county sheriff arrested Morse, Dorr, and A.S. Ridgeway the
local Kleagle. In these cases the charge was possessing alcohol, which,
given that the Klan’s method of entrapping local politicians with
alcohol certainly seems valid. In August of 1924, A.S. Ridgeway, was
“strongly encouraged” to leave the city of Princeton in order to avoid
42 Louisville Courier-Journal, June, 24, 1924 Page 1 section 1.  Lexington Leader, August 8, 1924 page
8. August 17, 1924  page 1.
43 Louisville Courier-Journal, June, 4 1924 page 3.  Lexington Leader, August 8, 1924 page 8.
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charges that he had violated prohibition laws. It was Ridgeway who
had allegedly purchased the alcohol. The city council of Princeton
further voted to request that Dorr and Morse both resign along with
Morse's assistant attorney J.E. Lisanby.  Furthermore, the city council
moved to outlaw new fraternal organizations within the city.44  Clearly
the Klan had failed in its attempts to overthrow the existing political
elites of the county which continued to rule the area and had purged
itself of members who opposed the status quo.
The Klan’s lack of success is difficult to explain in some cases.
Rallies in Frankfort and in Flemingsburg, another town on the Ohio
state line, were planned in June of 1924. However, the Flemingsburg
rally was limited to Klansmen from Ohio, and the Frankfort rally
contained only Klan marchers in the city's homecoming parade. No
specific reason can be seen why more Kentuckians did not join in
these events or why Klansmen were allowed these chances to
assemble. Likely many were intimidated official hostility to the Klan,
expressed through informal means.45
In 1928 the unpopularity of Al Smith's campaign for president
gave the Klan a sudden burst of renewed vigor and strength. In some
areas the Klan managed a brief revival. However the scope of this
revival in Kentucky was extremely limited in scope. 
The Klan’s efforts focused on one last attempt at creating a
presence in Louisville. Why the Klan chose to deal with a city that had
44Louisville Courier-Journal, August 16, 1924 page 3. Lexington Leader, August 17, 1924 page 1
section 2.
45Lexington Leader June 18, 1924 page 6; June 24, 1924 page 6. Louisville Courier Journal  June 27,
page 6 
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been so uniformly hostile is uncertain, but Louisville still represented
a large urban area where many might identify with the Klan's
message. The Klan attempted to rent the city of Louisville's “old
armory” as a meeting place, noting that it had previously been used by
Democrats for an Al Smith rally. The proposal caused considerable
discord in Louisville and resulted in a debate before the Louisville City
Commission.  The debates at the commissioners meeting on August
17 were unremarkable, and show the usual attitude toward the Klan
present throughout Kentucky. The Klan was able to attract only a few
supporters, who objected to the city's refusal. The Klansmen present
gave the usual protests that no harm against the city would ensue,
and that the Klan was a purely harmless patriotic organization. After
deliberation the city commissioners announced the unanimous
decision that the Klan would in fact be refused the use of the armory.
However, as the Klan rightly pointed out, previous use of such
facilities had been made by members of other bodies in the city, and it
was a common site of rallies and various other gatherings. Still the
officials in Louisville followed the course of action seen in numerous
other cases in the city and elsewhere throughout the state and barred
the meetings.46
The Klan was not entirely without success in Kentucky.  The
largest Klan rally ever held in Kentucky was in Henderson and had
over 13,000 attendees. However, this number and the location were
specifically chosen to give misleading results as to the Klan’s
46 Louisville Courier-Journal,   August 18, 1928 page 5. August 25, 1928 Page 1.   Lexington Leader,
August 18, 1928 page 5. August 25, 1928 page 5.
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popularity. Henderson is less than 5 miles from the city of Evansville,
Indiana. Given that no Klan gatherings followed in Henderson, it
would appear that these '13,000' Klansmen were all, or almost all,
members of the burgeoning Klan across the river in the state of
Indiana. A similar event occurred simultaneously in Pikeville on the
West Virginia border. Such efforts would serve to inflate the Klan's
apparent strength in the Commonwealth, and perhaps, leaders of the
Klan hoped, increase membership in what might be seen as a popular
organization. 47
Another rally in Alexandria, Kentucky on the same day drew
over 10,000 Klansmen. Like the simultaneous rally in Henderson, this
rally's location was chosen carefully based on its proximity to
Cincinnati, a city with its own large Klan population. While the Klan
in Cincinnati, or throughout Ohio, was not nearly as large or powerful
as the Klan in neighboring Indiana, it was, nevertheless, a powerful
force in its own right. Thus, like the rally in Henderson, the
Alexandria rally was designed to draw in Klansmen from neighboring
areas and artificially inflate the appearance of the Klan's success here
in Kentucky.48 
In January of 1924 Klan organizer E.H. Lougher was allowed to
speak in Harrodsburg, one of the few instances where he spoke in the
Commonwealth without being arrested. Later, on the night of
47 Louisville Courier-Journal August 8, 1924 page 2 section 1.  Lexington Leader August 8, 1924 page
8, August 17, 1924  page 1. Thomas Majestic “The Ku Klux Klan in the Big Sandy Valley” Journal of
Kentucky Studies  vol. 10 (1993), 75-80.
48Louisville Courier-Journal, May 31, 1924 page 6 section 2.  Lexington Leader, August, 8 1924 page
8. August 17, 1924 page 1.
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February 25, 1924 Klansmen burned a cross in Harrodsburg. These
are some of the only successful Klan events taking place in the
Commonwealth which likely made exclusive use of Kentuckians as
members. Others were the parades in Harrodsburg, Kentucky on June
13 1924 and June 20, 1924. Beyond the several hundred matchers
present, and a short speech by a masked member no other details are
available. However this would mark the Klan’s only recorded instance
of a successful parade deep inside the state. 49
Perhaps the relative success of the Harrodsburg Klan can be
attributed to the relatively weak nature of local politics there. Of the
nearly 15,000 people resident in the county, only 1,412 voted in the
primary of 1924, an especially uncommon occurrence in a state where
the total number of votes recorded was at times twice the county's
population. The most likely reason for this is that Harrodsburg and
Mercer County represent a political vacuum at the time when local
oligarchies were in disarray or transition, allowing the Klan a window
of opportunity not available elsewhere. However, this is not certain,
and no definite answer exists to explain this anomaly.50
In a few places the Klan existed but was so small or
insignificant that it took on an inconsequential role. In Madisonville,
the Klan appeared at a wedding on August 25, 1924.51 Klansmen also
appeared at a funeral in Providence, a town on the Tennessee line, but
49 Louisville Courier-Journal, February 26, 1924 page 5. Lexington Leader, February 26, 1924 page 8.
June 19 page 6. Harrodsburg Herald, January 4, 1924 page 1. June 20 1924 page 1. June 27, 1924
page 1.
50 Harrodsburg Harold, August 8, 1924 page 6. Klotter 195.
51 Lexington Leader, August 25, 1924 page 10.
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numbered only about 22. Attempts to appear at a funeral in Danville
were thwarted by the city's anti-mask law. 52
In all these instances some common themes stand out. All of
the Klan's large rallies and gatherings (large being defined as over 500
Klansmen present) took place along Kentucky's borders. The Klan’s
gatherings in Newport, Pikeville, and Alexandria are the only such
large scale meetings in the state. Such meetings were deliberate
attempts to create the appearance of a large and successful Klan
where none actually existed. Furthermore, these large gatherings as
well as all other smaller gatherings except those in Harrodsburg, were
isolated instances. Not once, in all the mentions of Klan activity in the
state does the Klan appear to have met twice in the same location
publicly. This is in sharp contrast to neighboring Indiana where
Klansmen met regularly and openly in locations such as Kokomo.
Clearly if local officials somehow allowed Klansmen to meet, they did
not repeat the mistake, an unmistakable indicator of local resistance
in Kentucky that was not present elsewhere.53
The Klan's downfall began in 1925, (as it was) wracked by
scandals both locally and nationally. While national headlines gave
great attention to the murder trial of D.C. Stephenson in Indiana for
his part in the killing of Madge Oberholtzer, the local Klan was not
without its legal woes. Other legal battles raged between Hiram Evans,
head of the Klan in 1925, and William Simmons the previous leader
and Klan founder. Elsewhere charges of graft and embezzlement
52 Lexington Leader, September 3, 1924. Lexington Leader, September, 1924 page 8.
53 Moore, 77, 80, 94-95.
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became common.54 
In March of 1925, former Klansmen from Fayette County sued
the Kentucky KKK and George Biggerstaff, Grand Dragon of the Klan
in Kentucky, for mismanagement of funds. The civil case that followed
revealed much about the inner workings of the Klan in the
Commonwealth, its size and extent. The Klan's questionable conduct
of business was displayed for all Kentuckians to see, as the case
dragged on for months. Thus the court battle is significant not only for
what it reveals about the nature of the Klan's activities, but also for its
role in shaping public perceptions of the organization.55
The stated goal of the plaintiffs was the return of money which
they had donated to the Klan for a headquarters which remained
unbuilt. They hoped to have the money returned and with interest.56
The Klan, it was alleged in court documents, had raised the
membership costs within the Commonwealth from the normal $10 to
$15, and had added a 50¢ 'tax' for each month's membership. These
two additional surcharges would raise the Klan's annual membership
fees to $21 for the year. These surcharges were allegedly kept by the
state Klan officers and not passed on to the headquarters in Atlanta.
Such additional costs certainly dispelled the likelihood of some
potential Klansmen joining the Invisible Empire.57
The Klan, from the time of its founding in Atlanta, had been a
54 Chalmers, 62–74. Leuchtenburg,  210–13.  Moore, 10. Lutholtz 1-8.
55 Lexington Leader, March 1, 1925 page 1.  Lexington Courier-Journal, March 1, 1925 page 1.
Paducah News-Democrat, November 1, 1925 page 1.
56 Fayette Circuit Court 9427, page 1-5.
57 Albert v. KKK Fayette County Circuit,  9427, 11 (Fayette District Court 1925). 7, 13.
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profit making venture. The monetary incentives to Kleagles and others
are well known. Yet if the Klan charged such high rates it could clearly
have produced even more  significant profits for local leaders. 
Further charges of corruption followed, including allegations
that the Klan had used aliases in signing leases and purchasing
phone lines. Other allegations were that the Klan had purchased a
$4,800 Cadillac for the Klan head in Lexington, George Biggerstaff,
that Biggerstaff had taken a salary of $60,000 a year, that he paid his
officers in the Klan the relatively great sum of $150 per month, and
that the Klan of Kentucky had over billed for Klan uniforms and
paraphernalia.58 
The plaintiffs, refused any efforts made toward divulging the
names of those taking part in the suit, or any other Klansmen. As
stated in an affidavit, “Plaintiffs further state that...to be known as
subscribers would be discrediting and humiliating in their business
and social lives.”59 Clearly the Klan in Kentucky was not the path to
social mobility, prestige, and political triumphs that it was elsewhere.
Also revealed in the case was that record keeping for the Klan at
both the state and county level were practically nonexistent. Klan
leaders admitted that no records of donations and dues had been
made and implied that other records were also not kept.60
Stalling tactics on the part of Klan leadership further kept the
case in the headlines for months. Klan leaders first sought to have the
58 Ibid.-4, 13.
59 Ibid. 2-3.
60 Albert v. KKK Fayette County Circuit,  9427, 11 (Fayette District Court 1925). 13
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case dismissed, citing a lack of evidence.  When these efforts failed,
the Klan then moved to have the case turned over to federal
jurisdiction; arguing that the Klan was not incorporated in Kentucky,
but in Georgia, and therefore the Fayette County circuit court had no
jurisdiction.61 
While the Klan succeeded in moving the case to Federal Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky, the delays cost the Klan heavily
in terms of public relations, as it dragged on for over a year. These
delaying tactics on the part of the Klan's leaders may have indicated
culpability to the citizens of Kentucky. While the suit was eventually
dropped, with the plaintiffs paying the defendant’s legal costs, it
dragged on well into June of 1926. Throughout this time those that
sat on the fence of the Klan question, moved decidedly away from the
Invisible Empire.62 
The Lexington Leader abandoned its friendly treatment of the
Klan in the wake of the scandal, and mention of the Klan's activities
throughout the state dropped while this and other cases went on.
Clearly, the Klan had received considerable attention and clearly its
publicity was no longer so favorable as it had once been.63
Nor should one forget that these events occurred simultaneously
with the murder trial of Stephenson. To the Kentucky residents of
1925 and 1926 the Klan, both locally and nationally, seemed far from
the clean and law abiding image it promoted. 
61 Ibid.
62Albert v. KKK 345  (US Federal Court Eastern District Kentucky, 1925) 71.
63Harrodsburg Herald Friday March 6, 1925 page 1. Lexington Leader June 9, 1925 page 2
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As has been noted, elites were generally at the forefront of
efforts to stymie the Klan’s growth,64 and the same holds true in
Kentucky, perhaps more so than in other regions of the country. Never
did Klansmen get far enough to involve themselves in Kentucky's local
politics as they did in nearby states. Local elites in Kentucky retained
far more power in the first decades of the 20th century than elites in
neighboring Indiana, and elsewhere. 
There was no real violence involving the Klan in Kentucky
during this period.  In all of the decade from 1920 to 1929, six men
were lynched in Kentucky, but robed Klansmen played no apparent
role in any of these cases. Nor were there any instances of flogging or
other violence involving Klansmen.65
Kentucky represents a unique case in its reactions to the Klan.
This becomes all the more apparent by comparison between the Klan’s
development here and its growth in neighboring states, especially
Indiana. While the Klan grew to phenomenal successes in the areas
north of the Ohio River, it failed to develop deep roots here.
Obviously the reason for this is in large part that Kentucky's
political elites chose quite deliberately to limit the Klan to a local
fraternal body completely denied political power. Often even this
limited role was denied the Klansmen and their organization was
simply barred from meeting altogether. Clearly the mayors, judges,
and others who instigated these measures knew the Klan represented
64Moore, 12, 79, 84-85,105, 139-141, 150
65 George C. Wright, Racial Violence in Kentucky, 1865-1940 (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana
Press, 1990), 6
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a clear threat to their power and sought to defuse that threat at its
earliest appearance. 
Yet why and how they were able to do this, or even how they
knew what the Klan meant to their power, is significant. For
politicians and others in Indiana, Ohio, and elsewhere allowed the
Klan to grow only to see it topple existing political structures. Why
then were Kentucky's elites able to thwart the growth of the Klan, and
why did they recognize it as a threat when this was not realized early
on in the Klan's development elsewhere?
The answers to these questions are a combination of factors
working to render the Klan in the Commonwealth ineffective. The
Klans of Indiana, Ohio, and most states where the Klan was
successful grew under reign of Simmons, the Klan’s founder, however
the late coming Kentucky Klan only set up roots later. Early on the
Klan appeared as a fraternal body, albeit one making special appeals
to white and Protestant nationalism. When Hiram Evans came to
power in the fall of 1922 the Klan took on an overtly political tone. The
Klan elsewhere grew while it appeared to be a benign organization,
only when it was widely established did it take on an overt political
agenda. When the Klan attempted to set root in Kentucky its political
ambitions had become clear.66 
 While the Klan gained an early foothold in Indianapolis,
Youngstown, Charleston, and other cities, it was never able to develop
a major base in any of Kentucky's urban areas, such as they were.
66Moore, 13-19 36, 36, 93, 155.
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The Klan was chased out of Louisville and never developed as a major
force in that city. While the Klan did have offices in Lexington, it never
became a significant factor in city politics or life. In almost all cases,
successful statewide Klan movements required an urban branch to
serve as hub for organizational activities.67 
Mickey Brennan’s decision to forbid the Klan's meetings in
1921, was a deliberate attempt to appeal to Catholic, immigrant, and
black voters. While the Klan nationally had not yet taken on the overt
political tones it did later, it still focused on divisive issues and in a
relatively cosmopolitan city such as Louisville the Invisible Empire
was offensive to many. Louisville's urban leadership did nothing
unusual in keeping an unwelcome force from entering the city. Yet the
implications were profound. Without an urban presence to serve as a
hub for Klan activities, the rural Klans lacked focus and organization. 
For the next two years, seldom did Klan recruiters come to the
Commonwealth. Few Kleagles would have chosen to focus their efforts
on Kentucky when Indiana, Ohio, and West Virginia offered rich
grounds for the recruitment of Klansmen. It must be remembered the
Klan recruiters were paid on a per capita basis. Indiana especially
represented an area known for great profitability, but Kentucky was a
relatively hostile and unknown region. 
This early failure on the part of the Klan to develop there gave
Kentucky's political leaders time to recognize the Klan as a divisive
issue both socially and politically. The Klan’s influence was especially
67Jackson, 8-48.
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obvious in neighboring Indiana. Politicians in a machine environment,
as Kentucky was in the 1920s, saw the clear threat to their power.
Reactionary populism, which the Klan represented, threatened to
undermine the boss based politics of Kentucky. 
Personal and economic incentives were not the only means
available to local elites that ensured their grip on power. Elites were
not above taking on a role within vigilante organizations that ensured
their continuing hold on power. While the tradionalist interpretation
that the Klan was an especially violent organization is no doubt
flawed, it is based on the attitudes of many at the time of the Klan's
greatest successes. Clearly, the degree to which the Klan was a violent
group varied by time and location, but it was certainly perceived as
violent by many. In Kentucky such an organization, existing outside
the traditional structure of vigilante justice in Kentucky, might have
served to undermine the power of elites. This was a threat elites did
not tolerate.
Clearly the Klan threatened elites. It threatened their role in
extra-legal violence, a role elites had exercised for some time. More
importantly, it threatened their control of the ballot box, a hold
developed over time thorough nepotism, vote buying, and personal
loyalties. The Klan’s brand of populism represented a real challenge to
political machines and the Klan represented a real form of reactionary
populism.
Thus, in 1924, when the Klan began its major attempts to gain
membership in Kentucky, local judges, mayors, and other political
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elites came down squarely and universally in opposition. While some
events unfolded relatively successfully for the Klan, the overwhelming
majority of Klan activities met clear opposition from local leadership.
Klansmen were denied the right to sit on juries, speak publicly, and
parade. When Klansmen did attempt these activities, they were
beaten, thrown in jail, or otherwise prevented from such actions. 
It has been noted that those attempting to gain influence in
political establishments were most likely to use Klan influence, with
established politicians doing so reluctantly if at all. In Kentucky,
where bosses were more entrenched than elsewhere, use of the Klan
as a means of advancement met much stiffer resistance than in
neighboring states.
By 1925 the Klan in Kentucky was still a relatively minor
influence. While the Klan did make appearances in some
communities, most notably Harrodsburg, the Klan did not grown into
a noticeable force anywhere in the Commonwealth and had been
stifled in most locations. The Klan was plagued nationally by
scandals, of which the most notorious was the murder trial of DC
Stephenson, Grand Dragon of Indiana, but it was not without scandal
in Kentucky.68 The small Klan in Kentucky was engaged in a civil
action that after a series of delaying motions was finally dropped in
June of 1926. The case, which lasted over 15 months, grabbed
attention and headlines away from whatever meager successes the
Klan might otherwise have possessed. 
68Moore, 189.
77
In spite of the plaintiff's case being dropped the negative
publicity ought not to be underestimated. For over a year, the Klan
attracted the attention of Kentuckians, not as an organization
supporting white superiority, nor one standing for '100% American'
values or ideas, but rather as a body being sued by former members
for mismanagement. 
Furthermore the Klan there appears to have charged over twice
the usual national fees for membership. If cost was any factor in Klan
membership, it was doubly significant here. 
The Klan did not grown enough locally to have any chance to
overcome the scandals that wracked it throughout 1925. When the
Klan both nationally and locally did make a brief resurgence in 1928
in opposition to Al Smith's candidacy for president, it never
approached its former power. 
Thus the Klan developed later in Kentucky than in any of the
state's neighbors. When the Invisible Empire finally did attempt to
plant roots in Kentucky, it had already assumed a political tone, and
for this reason met with severe opposition from political leaders.
Further, the Klan would only had a year between its first real
membership drives in Kentucky and the series of scandals that would
destroy it as a national force. The Klan never was able to set down
roots before it became an overt threat to politicians within the state.
Political leaders within Kentucky only had to fend off the Klan's
advances for a year before the organization was discredited both
nationally and locally.
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Had the Klan more time in which to organize, it might have
eventually made inroads into the machine that was Kentucky politics.
Few suspected in 1924 that the Klan would be largely a memory in ten
years. Had it continued to thrive and flourish, had Klan leaders not so
involved themselves in scandalous activities, it could have potentially
remained a force in American politics for years to come.
In summary, the Klan failed in Kentucky. It grew primarily when
presented initially as a fraternal body, appealing to White Protestant
Nationalism in its early phase before 1922. When Hiram Evans
became leader of the national organization in the fall of that year the
Klan took on overt political ambitions and in doing so it threatened
established political structures with its brand of reactionary populism.
In areas where it had not developed prior to Evans leadership, the
Klan was stifled by political elites who now clearly saw it as a threat to
their power. 
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